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UNITED STATES OBLIGATIONS UNDER
STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS: A NEW
METHOD OF EXTRADITION?
William J. Norton*
I. INTRODUCTION - AN OVERVIEW OF EXTRADITION
The laws of the United States . . . receive every fugitive and no au-
thority has been given to our Executives to deliver them up.
Thomas Jefferson'
The first extradition case in the young American Republic nearly
resulted in a censure of President John Adams for directing a Federal
Judge to permit British naval personnel to take custody of an alleged
murderer who claimed to be an American citizen pressed into British
service. 2 Several congressmen felt that the matter should have been
presented to the court for a determination of whether the accused was
guilty and, in any event, the case should have been tried in an American
court.3 Then Representative John Marshall helped defeat the notion for
censure by a speech characterized as "one of the most consumate juridi-
cal arguments . . . ever pronounced in the halls of legislation."' He
demonstrated that the offense had been committed in a location subject
to British jurisdiction, that a solemn treaty required that the individual
be surrendered to Great Britain when there was sufficient evidence of
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of Military Review, the Court of Military Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court. The opinions
and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views
of either the Judge Advocate General's School, U.S. Army or any other government agency.
I J. MOORE, EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION 23 (1891).
10 ANNALS OF CONG. 532-33, 541-78 (1800) [1789-1824]. See United States v. Robins (sic),
27 F. Cas. 825 (No. 16175) (D.C.S.C. 1799). The case involved one Jonathan Robbins alias
Thomas Nash. He purportedly admitted being an Irishman before being hung in chains. Id. at 842.
1 B. ZIEGLER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JOHN MARSHALL 319-20 (1939) [hereinafter cited
as B. ZIEGLER].
I Story, Life, Character and Services of ChiefJustice Marshall, in 3 J. DILLIO, JOHN MARSHALL
357 (1903).
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his criminality, and that President Adams had no choice but to surren-
der the individual to the British once he had determined that the evi-
dence was sufficient and the treaty required the surrender.5
The controversy surrounding the surrender of the sailor and his subse-
quent execution by the British following a court-martial may have con-
tributed to President Adams' defeat in the 1800 election. At any rate,
the issue of extradition lay dormant for more than a generation after
the Jay Treaty provision requiring extradition of murderers and forger-
ers expired in 1807. No further extradition arrangements were made by
the United States until the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842,1 which
led to a series of extradition treaties with other nations. At about this
same time Congress enacted a statute, that survives today with little
modification, entrusting the courts with the initial responsibility of act-
ing upon extradition requests from abroad by determining whether suffi-
cient evidence exists to warrant the trial of the alleged fugitive, and
whether the treaty requires the extradition upon a positive answer to the
first issue.8
Extradition is an emotional subject where two conflicting passions
may affect the legal result. When one considers the desirability of insur-
ing that felons should be subjected to trial to determine innocence or
guilt and appropriate punishment, there is no better place for the trial
than where the offense occurred as the witnesses can be easily assem-
bled. On the other hand, if one feels that his own system of courts is
far superior and fairer than any other and has a distrust of foreign
methods, then the alleged criminal should not be surrendered. Older
writers in international law felt that all states were obligated either to
deliver up those fugitives who had left the location where the offense was
committed to the sovereign over that territory, 9 or to proceed against
B. ZIEGLER, supra note 3, at 320-23.
S See United States ex rel. Martinez-Angosto v. Mason, 344 F.2d 673, 684 (2d Cir. 1965).
The Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation with Great Britain (Jay Treaty), Nov. 19,
1794, [1795] 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105, contained in Article XXVII a provision for the mutual
delivery up to justice of fugitives charged with murder and forgery. This article expired in accord
with the Treaty's terms on October 28, 1807, and the lack of friendly relations between the United
States and Great Britain at the time prevented any steps to renew it. R. RAFUSE, THE EXTRADITION
OF NATIONALS 15 (1939) [hereinafter cited as RAFUSE]. Although subsequent years brought nego-
tiations with Great Britain, Mexico and Spain looking toward extradition treaties, none were
successful until the Treaty with Great Britain as to Boundaries, the Slave Trade and Giving Up of
Criminals (Webster-Ashburton Treaty), Aug. 9, 1842, [1842] 8 Stat. 572, T.S. No. 119. This treaty
was followed in 1843 by extradition arrangements with France and similar treaties with several
other states in the next decade. I J. MOORE, supra note 1, at 83-100. See also I SHEARER,
EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-16 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SHEARER].
Act of Aug. 12, 1848, ch. 168, 9 Stat. 302 (now 10 U.S.C. §§ 3184, 3186, 3188, 3190 (1970)).
H. GROTIus, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 527 (1646 ed. J. Scott transl. 1925).
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the criminal in their own courts. 0 However, it is settled practice today
that there is no requirement to extradite individual criminals in the
absence of extradition treaties between the state desiring to try or punish
the individual and the state where the accused happens to be."
Civil law countries have generally been able to resolve the emotional
conflicts generated by extradition by willingly extraditing aliens and
providing for punishment of nationals in their own courts." Common
law nations, where jurisdiction is commonly limited to the location of
the offense, 13 frequently provide among themselves for extradition of
all persons, but enter into treaties providing only limited requirements
of extradition of nationals with civil law countries. 14
The United States, whether it would be constitutionally permissible
or not,"5 has not adopted any criminal code which would generally
provide for the punishment of its own citizens for ordinary crimes com-
mitted abroad. 6 The major exception to this is the Uniform Code of
10 Id.; E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 137 (1st
ed. J. Scott transl. 1916).
SHEARER, supra note 7, at 23-24.
n Id. at 102-10.
'3 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
", SHEARER, supra note 7, at 21, 68-72. The United States on January 1, 1972 had effective
extradition treaties with the following countries which contained no reference to the nationality of
the fugitive: Italy, Mar. 23, 1868, [1868] 15 Stat. 629, T.S. No. 174; Ecuador, June 28, 1872, [1873]
18 Stat. 199, T.S. No. 79; United Kingdom, Dec. 22, 1931, [19321 47 Stat. 2122, T.S. No. 849;
Union of South Africa, Dec. 8, 1947, [1951] 2 U.S.T. 884, T.I.A.S. No. 2243; Israel, Dec. 10,
1962, [1963] 14 U.S.T. 1707, T.I.A.S. No. 5476. Included under the Extradition Treaty with the
United Kingdom, or previous ones with that nation also making no exemption for nationals or
citizens, are the following countries: Australia, Barbados, Botswana, Burma, Canada, Ceylon,
Cyprus, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Guyana, India, Ireland, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Malay-
sia, Malta, Mauritius, Nauru, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zambia. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (1972). New
Zealand was previously covered by treaties with the United Kingdom, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
TREATIES IN FORCE 165 (1970), but a recent treaty has superceded such obligations. Under the
New Extradition Treaty with New Zealand, Jan. 12, 1970, [19701 22 U.S.T. I, T.I.A.S. No. 7035,
extradition of nationals is discretionary with the executive authorities of the state requested to
deliver the fugitive. See note 22 infra.
Under the doctrine of Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913), extradition treaties containing no
mention of the nationality of the fugitive compel the United States to surrender American citizens
if all the other requirements of the treaty are satisfied.
15 If criminal conduct by American citizens abroad were considered an offense against the law
of nations, Congress could define and provide for the punishment thereof. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 10. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1932); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.,
344 U.S. 280, 285-86 (1952). Cf American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-57
(1909).
1S 45 AM. JUR.2D, Int'l Law § 82 (1969). Many federal statutes provide for the punishment of
certain common law felonies such as murder, rape and robbery committed within the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2031-32, 2111
(1970). But see id. at § 953. Congress has recently been considering legislation that would provide
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Military Justice, 7 which applies in all places, but is effectively limited
to persons on active duty in the Armed Forces. 8
In order to avoid creating an absolute immunity for its citizens who
commit crimes overseas, the United States has been generally willing
to extradite its own citizens on a reciprocal basis with other states.'9
Civil law countries have normally refused, either on the basis of internal
law or their own constitutions, to enter into treaties that compel the
extradition of their own citizens.20
When confronted with a treaty provision that is fairly common pro-
viding that "neither party shall be required to deliver up its own sub-
jects," the Supreme Court found that there was no authority for the
United States to surrender fugitive American citizens to France.2 1 Since
for the punishment of civilians accompanying American armed forces overseas in federal courts
within the United States. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS:
DRAFT OF A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE xxxi, 19 (1970). See also Agata, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: Section 208, in I WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 69-76 (1970). The proposed new code would cover in part the immunities
from United States criminal proceedings generated by the Supreme Court decisions cited in note
18 infra. See Mills, O'Callahan Overseas. A Reconsideration of Military Jurisdiction Over Service-
men's Non-Service Related Crimes Committed Abroad, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 325, 359 n.238, 363-
67 (1972). An old British view of jurisdiction over offenses committed overseas can be found in
W. HALL, FOREIGN JURISDICTION OF THE BRITISH CROWN 12-14 (1894).
" 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970).
Is Art. 5, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 805 (1970); Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1 (1957); Kinselle v. Kruger, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); McElroy v. United States ex rel.
Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); United States v. Averette, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 363, 41 C.M.R. 363
(1970). The Supreme Court cases held unconstitutional the Congressional grant of limited author-
ity for the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over discharged servicemen (Art. 3(a), U.C.M.J.,
10 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1970)), and civilian employees and other persons accompanying the Armed
Forces outside the United States (Art. 2 (!1), U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 802 (II) (1970)). The Court
of Military Appeals in the Averette case decided that a provision of the Code (Art. 2 (10),
U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 802 (10) (1970)) purporting to grant jurisdiction over civilians accompany-
ing the armed forces overseas in wartime was not operative in an undeclared war such as Vietnam.
" SHEARER, supra note 7, at 110. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty with Bavaria, Preamble, Sep.
12, 1853, [1854] 10 Stat. 1022, T.S. No. 17.
2 See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ, art. 16(2) (1949) (W. Ger.). At least one writer from a civil law
country considers that non-extradition of nationals is almost a principle of international law. S.
LAZAREFF, STATUS OF MILITARY FORCES UNDER CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 232, 266 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as LAZAREFF]. See also Text of Negotiating History of NATO Status of Forces
Supplementary Agreement with Germany 1087, 1098 (1963) (computer generated text prepared
by the Air Force Accounting and Finance Center).
11 Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936). The clause which exempts
nationals of the requested state from any obligation of extradition had been interpreted in Great
Britain to permit discretionary extradition. See RAFUSE, supra note 7, at 56-73. The clause, or one
very similar thereto, appears in the United States extradition treaties with the following countries
in effect on 1 January 1972: Albania, Mar. 1, 1933, [1935149 Stat. 3313, T.S. No. 902; Austria,
Jan. 31, 1930, [19301 46 Stat. 2779, T.S. No. 822; Belgium, Oct. 26, 1901, [1902] 32 Stat. 1894,
T.S. No. 409; Bolivia, Apr. 21, 1900, [1901] 32 Stat. 1857, T.S. No. 399; Bulgaria, Mar. 19, 1924,
[1924] 43 Stat. 1886, T.S. No. 687; Chile, Apr. 17, 1900, [1902] 32 Stat. 1850, T.S. No. 407;
1975] STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS
that time the United States has generally tended to have a clause in
extradition treaties that permits both parties to deliver fugitive citizens
whenever they decide in their own discretion to do so.22 The validity of
such a permissive clause that leaves the delivery up to the discretion of
an executive rather than a judicial official has not been directly tested
Colombia, May 7, 1888, [1891] 26 Stat. 1534, T.S. No. 58; Congo (Brazzaville), Jan. 6, 1909,
[1911] 37 Stat. 1526, T.S. No. 361; Costa Rica, Nov. 10, 1922, [1923] 43 Stat. 1621, T.S. No.
668; Cuba, Apr. 6, 1904, [1905] 33 Stat. 2265, T.S. No. 440; Czechoslovakia, July 2, 1925, [1926]
44 Stat. 2367, T.S. No. 734; Dominican Republic, June 19, 1909, [1910] 36 Stat. 2468, T.S. No.
550; Egypt, Aug. II, 1874, (1875] 19 Stat. 572, T.S. No. 270; El Salvador, Apr. 18, 1911, [1911]
37 Stat. 1516, T.S. No. 560; Estonia, Nov. 8, 1923, [1924] 43 Stat. 1849, T.S. No. 703; Finland,
Aug. 1, 1924, [1925] 44 Stat. 2002, T.S. No. 710; Germany, July 12, 1930, [1931] 47 Stat. 1862,
T.S. No. 836; Greece, May 6, 1931, [1932147 Stat. 2185, T.S. No. 855; Haiti, Aug. 9, 1904, [1905]
34 Stat. 2858, T.S. No. 447; Honduras, Jan. 15, 1909, [1912137 Stat. 1616, T.S. No. 569; Hungary,
July 3, 1856, [1856] 11 Stat. 691, T.S. No. 9; Iceland, Jan. 6, 1902, [1906] 32 Stat. 1906, T.S.
No. 405; Indonesia, June 2, 1887, [1889] 26 Stat. 1481, T.S. No. 256; Iraq, June 7, 1934, [19361
49 Stat. 3380, T.S. No. 907; Latvia, Oct. 16, 1923, [1924] 43 Stat. 1738, T.S. No. 677; Liechten-
stein, May 20, 1936, [1937] 50 Stat. 1337, T.S. No. 915; Lithuania, Apr. 9, 1924, [1924] 43 Stat.
1835, T.S. No. 699; Luxembourg, Oct. 28, 1883, [1884] 23 Stat. 808, T.S. No. 196; Monaco, Feb.
15, 1939, [1940] 54 Stat. 1780, T.S. No. 959; Netherlands, June 2, 1887, [1889126 Stat. 1481, T.S.
No. 256; Norway, June 7, 1893, (18931 28 Stat. 1187, T.S. No. 262; Panama, May 25, 1904, [1905]
34 Stat. 2851, T.S. No. 445; Paraguay, Mar. 26, 1913, [1914] 38 Stat. 1754, T.S. No. 584; Peru,
Nov. 28, 1899, [1901] 31 Stat. 1921, T.S. No. 288; Poland, Nov. 22, 1927, [1929] 46 Stat. 2282,
T.S. No. 789; Portugal, May 7, 1908, [1908] 35 Stat. 2071, T.S. No. 512; Romania, July 23, 1924,
[1925] 44 Stat. 2020, T.S. No. 713; San Marino, Jan. 10, 1906, [1908] 35 Stat. 1971, T.S. No.
495; Switzerland, May 14, 1900, [1901] 31 Stat. 1928, T.S. No. 354; Thailand, Dec. 30, 1922,
[1924] 43 Stat. 1749, T.S. No. 681; Turkey, Aug. 6, 1923, [1934] 49 Stat. 2692, T.S. No. 872;
Venezuela, Jan. 19, 21, 1922, [1924143 Stat. 1698, T.S. No. 675; Yugoslavia, Oct. 25, 1901, [1902]
32 Stat. 1890, T.S. No. 406; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (1972). The Extradition
Treaty with France which was the subject of the Valentine case was modified in 1971 to authorize
discretionary surrender of the requested state's nationals. Extradition Treaty with France, Feb. 12,
1970, [1971] 22 U.S.T. 407, T.I.A.S. No. 7136.
1 The extradition treaties with the following countries coming into effect after the November
9, 1936 Supreme Court decision in Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936),
contain provisions permitting extradition of the requested state's nationals when that state's appro-
priate authorities deem it proper: Liberia, Nov. 1, 1937, [1939] 54 Stat. 1733, T.S. No. 955;
Sweden, Oct. 24, 1961, [1963] 14 U.S.T. 1845, T.I.A.S. No. 5496; Brazil, Jan. 16, 1961, [1964]
15 U.S.T. 2093, T.I.A.S. No. 5691; New Zealand, Jan. 12, 1970, [1970] 22 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S.
No. 7035; France, Feb. 12, 1970, [1971] 22 U.S.T. 407, T.I.A.S. No. 7075; Spain, May 19, 1970,
[1971] 22 U.S.T. 737, T.I.A.S. No. 7136; Argentina, Jan. 21, 1972, [1972] 23 U.S.T. 3501,
T.I.A.S. No. 7510. The only presently effective United States extradition treaty which precludes
surrender of nationals and which was signed after the Valentine decision is the Extradition Treaty
with Monaco, Feb. 15, 1939, [1940] 54 Stat. 1780, T.S. No. 959. The Extradition Treaty with
Liechtenstein, May 20, 1936, [1937] 50 Stat. 1337, T.S. 915, became effective after the Valentine
holding but was signed prior thereto.
Older United States extradition treaties permitting discretionary surrender of nationals and in
effect on January 1, 1972 were with the following countries: Japan, Apr. 29, 1886, [1886] 24 Stat.
1015, T.S. No. 191; Mexico, Feb. 22, 1899, [1899] 31 Stat. 1818, T.S. No. 242; Argentina, Sep.
26, 1896, [1900] 31 Stat. 1883, T.S. No. 6; Guatamala, Feb. 27, 1903, [1903] 33 Stat. 2147, T.S.
No. 425; Nicaragua, Mar. I, 1905, [1907] 35 Stat. 1869, T.S. No. 462; Uruguay, Mar. 11, 1905,
[1908] 35 Stat. 2028, T.S. No. 501. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (1972).
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by the Supreme Court. The leading case relied on treaties containing
such a discretionary clause to justify its interpretation that the Extradi-
tion Treaty with France created neither a mandatory nor a permissive
obligation to extradite citizens.2 3 The Court has not actually been
averse to extradition of American citizens and upheld extradition of
citizens even when the accused established that the other party to the
treaty was refusing to comply with its obligations to extradite its own
nationals.2 4
One understandable reason for a reluctance to extradite nationals is
the feeling that a citizen deserves to be tried by judges and peers of his
own nationality, especially when he has managed to return to the terri-
tory where only his own native country can legitimately exercise power
over him. Thus, one could claim that he should not be subjected to
courts of another nation where prejudice against him may exist solely
because he is a foreigner and the court proceedings are likely to be
unintelligible to him .25 The Senate of the United States showed a certain
distrust of foreign proceedings in the early 1950's during the approval
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA). 2 Several senators felt that American servicemen
should be tried only by courts-martial for offenses committed abroad
in order to insure that their constitutional rights as Americans would
be preserved.2Y There was much discussion concerning the lack of any
requirement in some courts for proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
the danger of communist judges in France and Italy. 28 While the oppo-
nents of NATO SOFA were unsuccessful in defeating ratification or
adding a reservation to the treaty that would have refused to recognize
any foreign country's right to try American servicemen, the Senate's'
advice and consent did contain a statement that requires military com-
manders to seek diplomatic intervention in any case tried by foreign
authorities where the accused might be denied the constitutional rights
he would enjoy in the United States.2
2 Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 12-18 (1936).
24 Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913); see Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901).
25 RAFUSE, supra note 7, at 145-47.
2 Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their
Forces, June 19, 1951, [1953] 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846 [hereinafter cited as NATO
SOFA]. The NATO SOFA now has the following parties: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE
290 (1971). See 99 CONG. REC. 4659-74 (1953).
2 See, e.g., 99 CONG. REC. 4659-74 (1953).
n Id. at 4668, 8733, 8741.
29 Id. at 8730. The final text of the Senate Resolution is found at 4 U.S.T. 1828-29 [1953-52].
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While NATO SOFA was being ratified, there was no mention in the
Senate that extradition was involved." The treaty was designed, at least
in that part concerning criminal jurisdiction, to settle the conflicting
claims between the criminal authorities of the state where American and
other foreign forces were stationed (the receiving state) and the military
authorities of the foreign state (the sending state). 3' Since both the
domestic and military authorities could claim a legitimate basis under
their own law for subjecting a serviceman and some related civilian
personnel to their own courts operating in the receiving state, a system
of priorities of the right to exercise that claimed jurisdiction was de-
vised. 32 It was almost taken for granted that the accused individual
would remain within the receiving state's territory.
Extradition, however, contemplates something different than just a
determination of which of two sovereigns operating within the same
territory may exercise its criminal powers. The Supreme Court's classic
definition of extradition is formulated as:
the surrender by one nation to another of an individual accused or
convicted of an offense outside of its own territory, and within the
territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and
to punish him, demands the surrender.31
More recently, American writers have de-emphasized the underscored
portions of that definition and concentrated more on the process of
surrender:
Extradition is the process by which persons charged with or convicted
of crimes against the law of a State and found in a foreign State are
returned by the latter to the former for trial or punishment. 3'
Thus, American extradition contemplates the physical transfer of an
individual from the territory of one state to that of another. The process
involved in SOFAs, at least where the accused remains within the receiv-
ing state from the time of the offense until the end of punishment, does
not involve any transfer between territories of different states. Neverthe-
" No mention of extradition is contained in the Senate debate, id. at 4320, 4659-74, 8724-82,
8835-38.
1, LAZAREFF, supra note 20, at 128.
31 J. SNEE & K. PYE, STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS; CRIMINAL JURISDICTION (1957)
[hereinafter cited as J. SNEE & K. PYEJ.
3 Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902) (emphasis added).
" 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INT'L LAW 727 (1968) [hereinafter cited as M. WHITEMAN]; See
also IV G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INT'L LAW i (1942): "Extradition is that process by which
fugitives from the justice of one state who seek asylum in another state are delivered up by the
latter to the former."
1975]
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less, one writer has termed the SOFA arrangement as a "formal variant
of extradition,"35 and one NATO country has used its internal extradi-
tion law prohibiting surrender of nationals, to justify a refusal to surren-
der to American forces a soldier who had deserted the Army while
stationed in the country of his own nationality.
36
During the 1970's, three reported federal court decisions have articu-
lated the right and duty of the United States Armed Forces to effectuate
alleged American obligations contained in the NATO and other SOFAs
to return servicemen to the receiving state after the soldiers and airmen
involved had left the receiving state during the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction over them by foreign authorities 7.3  In reaching these deci-
sions permitting the armed forces to deliver the serviceman from the
United States to the receiving state's authorities for trial or punishment,
the courts have relied more heavily upon the international obligations
of the United States rather than any inherent right of the armed service
involved to assign its personnel wherever it considered appropriate.'
While the courts hesitated to denominate the proposed action of the
military authorities as extradition,39 two of the cases referred exten-
sively to important extradition cases to justify the process.40
The obligations found by the courts may be equally applicable to
certain civilian personnel connected with American military communi-
ties overseas. Thus American military or other designated authorities
could arguably be required to return civilians encompassed by SOFAs
to a receiving state if such a civilian is alleged to have committed an
offense subject to the receiving state's jurisdiction but has managed to
depart the receiving state before the exercise of jurisdiction is com-
pleted.
The purpose of this paper is to examine critically the international
A. Evans, Acquisition of Custody over the International Fugitive Offender-Alternatives to
Extradition: A Survey of United States Practice, XL BRIT. Y.B. INT'L LAw 77, 80 (1964).
3' LAZAREFF, supra note 20, at 78.
z United States ex rel. Stone v. Robinson, 309 F. Supp. 1261 (W.D. Pa. 1970), affd, 431 F.2d
548 (3d Cir. 1970); Williams v. Rogers, 449 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 926
(1972); Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972). These
cases are discussed in detail in Chapter IV infra.
u United States ex rel. Stone v. Robinson, 309 F. Supp. 1261, 1268-69 (W.D. Pa. 1970);
Williams v. Rogers, 449 F.2d 513, 521 (8th Cir. 1971); Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1219-20
n.58 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
" "Sergeant Williams is not being unlawfully extradited." Williams v. Rogers, 449 F.2d 513,
522 (8th Cir. 1971).
40 Id. at 520-21, referring to Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936);
Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1218-19, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1972), referring to Neely v. Henkel,
180 U.S. 109 (1901) and Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
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obligation of the United States to return to various receiving states such
personnel encompassed by a SOFA, whether civilian or military, who
have somehow managed to depart the receiving state before its criminal
process has been completed. After first examining the terms of the
SOFAs relevant to such a requirement and the views of various com-
mentators, the recent cases will be reviewed.
II. STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT AND THE OBLIGATION TO
COOPERATE IN THE EXERCISE OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
The Cold War following World War II generated collective defense
arrangements, such as NATO, which envisioned the lengthy stationing
of a country's armed forces on the territory of an allied state, not as
victorious occupants but as components of multinational forces in
peaceful cooperation with the sovereign government of the allied foreign
state.4' The forces thus stationed not unnaturally acquired the same
civilian accoutrements common to installations in their home states; i.e.,
civilian employees and the families of both the servicemen and such
employees. The presence of the resultant large foreign military com-
munities on a scale not previously experienced required some accomo-
dation between the states providing the forces and those providing the
stationing sites in order to cope with the legal problems of the individual
serviceman and his civilian compatriots. Not the least of these problems
was the resolution of the conflicting claims to jurisdiction over criminal
offenses allegedly committed by the military or civilian members of the
communities when both the receiving state and the military forces of the
sending state could claim a basis under applicable law to prosecute and
punish the same act or omission.'2 The problems were generally resolved
for most of the NATO countries by the SOFA negotiated in 1951 with
a formula of a priority of rights in exercising jurisdiction that was
thereafter adopted in several other situations outside of the NATO
structure.
3
A. Jurisdictional Scheme of the SOFAs
While the NATO SOFA deals with several legal problems, such as
claims," driving and motor vehicle licenses,"5 and custom and tax ex-
41 See LAZAREFF, supra note 20, at I.
'2 See generally id. at 1!3; G. STAMBUK, AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES ABROAD 3-13 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as G. STAMBUK]; Stranger, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Visiting Armed Forces,
52 INT'L L. STUDIES, xi, 154-56 (1957-58) [hereinafter cited as Stranger].
'3 Snee, NA TO Agreement on Status: Travaux Preparatories, 54 INT'L L. STUDIES 1, 4 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Snee].
"NATO SOFA, art. VIII.
' Id. at arts. IV, XI.
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emptions, 46 its most heralded accomplishment is the subjection of the
conflicting claims of the right to exercise criminal jurisdiction, to priori-
ties based upon the effects of the offense and the status of the individual
allegedly committing it. 7 Whenever an offense is committed by a serv-
iceman or civilian employee, subject to the criminal or disciplinary
jurisdiction of the military law of the sending state, either in the per-
formance of official duty or directed solely against the security, property
or person of the sending state or a member of its military community,
the military authorities of the sending state have the primary right to
exercise the criminal process within the receiving state. In the case of
all other offenses punishable by the laws of both the receiving and
sending states, the authorities of the receiving state have the primary
right to exercise their jurisdiction. Both the military and local authori-
ties are required to notify the other whenever their state determines not
to exercise its primary right to exercise jurisdiction and to give sympa-
thetic consideration to waiving its primary right in any case when the
authorities of the other state request it to do so.4
This scheme of jurisdictional priorities was ultimately approved by
the United States Senate despite considerable opposition by some Sena-
tors to giving up an alleged claim under traditional international law to
immunity for servicemen stationed in a foreign country."9 The advice
and consent of the Senate, however, was accompanied by a resolution
indicating that the jurisdiction provisions did not constitute a precedent
for future agreements. 0 Notwithstanding the resolution, since 1951 the
United States has concluded sixteen executive agreements with twelve
nations covering the status of its forces and civilians connected with
those forces stationed overseas"' where the NATO scheme of a priority
'I Id. at arts. XIxIv. See generally R. ELLERT, NATO FAIR TRIAL SAFEGUARDS 2 (1963).
,7 NATO SOFA, art. VII. See LAZAREFF, supra note 20, at 444-45; G. DRAPER, CIVILIANS AND
THE NATO STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT 182 (1966); J. SNEE & K. PYE, supra note 32, at 8-9.
e NATO SOFA, art. VII. The full text of Article VII is found in Appendix A.
, See, e.g., 99 CONG. REc. 8735-48 (1953). Two articles by an Army judge advocate were relied
on heavily by opponents to the SOFA's criminal jurisdiction provisions. King, Jurisdiction Over
Friendly Foreign Armed Forces, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 539 (1942); King, Further Developments
Concerning Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1946). The
articles are reprinted at 99 CONG. REc. 4659 and 8748 (1953). But see the memorandum presented
by Attorney General Brownell to the Senate. Int'l Law and the Status of Forces Agreement, id.
at 8762 (1953).
", 99 CONG. REC. 8730 (1953). For the final form of the Sense of the Senate Resolution accom-
panying the advice and consent to NATO SOFA, see 4 U.S.T. 1828-29 [1953-52].
1, Annex to the Agreement of May 5, 1951 with Iceland on the Status of United States Personnel
and Property, May 8, 1951, [195112 U.S.T. 1533, T.I.A.S. No. 2295 [hereinafter cited as Icelandic
SOFA]; Amendment of Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the
Security Treaty with Japan, Sept. 29, 1953, [1953] 4 U.S.T. 1846, T.I.A.S. No. 2848 [hereinafter
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cited as Former Japanese SOFA]; Agreement under Article IV of the Treaty of Mutual Coopera-
tion and Security: Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan,
Jan. 19, 1960, 11960] 11 U.S.T. 1652, T.I.A.S. No. 4510 [hereinafter cited as Japanese SOFA];
Defense Agreement on Use of Facilities in Agreed Areas in Libya, Sept. 9, 1954, [1954] 5 U.S.T.
2449, T.I.A.S. No. 3107 [hereinafter cited as Libyan SOFA] (no longer in force, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 158 (1974)); Agreement with Nicaragua for the Establishment of a
LORAN Transmitting Station, Sept. 5, 1958, [1958] 9 U.S.T. 1206, T.I.A.S. No. 4106 [hereinafter
cited as Nicaraguan SOFA] (applicable only to uniformed Coast Guard personnel); Agreement
with Pakistan Concerning Establishment of Communications Unit, July 18, 1959, [1959] 10 U.S.T.
1366, T.I.A.S. No. 4281 [hereinafter cited as Pakistani SOFA] (expired July 17, 1969, U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 171 (1969)); Agreement with United Kingdom Concerning United
States Defence Areas in the Federation of the West Indies, Feb. 10, 1961, [1961] 12 U.S.T. 408,
T.I.A.S. No. 4734 [hereinafter cited as West Indies SOFA]; Agreement with United Kingdom for
the Establishment in the Bahama Islands of an Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center,
Oct. 11, 1963, [1963] 14 U.S.T. 1431, T.I.A.S. No. 5441 [hereinafter cited as Bahaman SOFA];
Agreement with United Kingdom On Availability of Certain Indian Ocean Islands for Defense
Purposes, Dec. 30, 1966, [1966] 18 U.S.T. 28, T.I.A.S. No. 6196 [hereinafter cited as Indian Ocean
SOFA]; Agreement with United Kingdom on Tracking Stations: Facility on the Island of Mahe
(Seychelles), Dec. 30, 1966, [1966] 18 U.S.T. 43, T.I.A.S. No. 6197 [hereinafter cited as Seychelles
SOFA]; Agreement Concerning the Status of United States Forces in Australia, May 9, 1963,
[1963] 14 U.S.T. 506, T.I.A.S. No. 5349 [hereinafter cited as Australian SOFA]; Agreement
Concerning Military Bases in the Philippines: Criminal Jurisdiction Arrangements, Aug. 19, 1965,
[1965] 16 U.S.T. 1090, T.I.A.S. No. 5851 [hereinafter cited as Philippine SOFA]. This agreement
replaced Article XIII of Agreement with the Philippines Concerning Military Bases, Mar. 14,
1947, [1947] 61 Stat. 4019, T.I.A.S. No. 1775 [hereinafter cited as Philippine Bases Agreement],
which covered the same legal areas as NATO SOFA but has a different scheme of delineating
criminal jurisdiction. Id. at art. XIII, para. 1, 4, 6. See J. DODD, CRIMINAL JURISDICTION UNDER
THE UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINE MILITARY BASES AGREEMENT 37-49 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
J. DODD]; Agreement on the Status of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of China, Aug.
31, 1965, [1966] 71 U.S.T. 373, T.I.A.S. No. 5986 [hereinafter cited as Chinese SOFA]; Agree-
ment Under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Regarding Facilities and Areas and the
Status of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea, July 9, 1966, [1967] 17 U.S.T.
1677, T.I.A.S. No. 6127 [hereinafter cited as Korean SOFA]; Defense Agreement on Use of
Military Facilities in Spain, Sept. 25, 1970, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 2259, T.I.A.S. No. 6977 [hereinafter
cited as Spanish SOFA]. There is also a very brief agreement covering only uniformed personnel
and civilian employees, which varies considerably from the previously mentioned SOFAs, but will
be considered hereafter because of its custodial provisions and some resemblance to NATO SOFA.
Agreement with New Zealand on Operations in Antarctica, Dec. 24, 1958, [1958] 9 U.S.T. 1502,
T.I.A.S. No. 4151 [hereinafter cited as New Zealand SOFA].
There are four additional executive agreements delineating jurisdictional rights that might be
categorized as SOFAs rather than military agreements bestowing immunity on personnel. These
are not considered later in this paper because of dissimilarity to NATO SOFA. Agreement with
United Kingdom concerning the Bahamas Long Range Proving Ground, July 21, 1950, [1950] 1
U.S.T. 545, T.I.A.S. No. 2099; Agreement with United Kingdom Concerning Establishment of
Additional Sites in Saint Lucia, June 25, 1956, [1956] 7 U.S.T. 1939, T.I.A.S. No. 3595; Agree-
ment with United Kingdom Concerning Establishment of Additional Sites on Ascension Island,
June 25, 1956, [1956] 7 U.S.T. 1999, T.1.A.S. No. 3603; Agreement with Bahrain on Deployment
of the United States Middle East Force, Dec. 23, 1971, [1971] 22 U.S.T. 2184, T.I.A.S. No. 7263.
One recent writer indicates that the United States has SOFAs of the NATO type with Brazil
and Ethiopia. Mills, O'Callahan Oversea: A Reconsideration of Military Jurisdiction Over Serv-
icemen's Non-Service Related Crimes Committed Abroad, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 325, 337n.86
(1972). The Military Assistance Agreement with Brazil, Mar. 15, 1952, art. VI, [1953] 4 U.S.T.
170, 178, T.I.A.S. No. 2776, in effect bestows diplomatic immunity to military personnel of Brazil
and the United States. The Agreement Concerning the Utilization of Defense Installations within
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of the right to exercise jurisdiction has been followed with only minor
variations.52
B. Arrest and Custody of Servicemen and Civilians
The problems involved in the resolution of disputes over which au-
thorities have the primary right to exercise criminal jurisdiction, or in
Ethiopia, May 22, 1953, art. XVII, [19531 5 U.S.T. 749, 756-58, T.I.A.S. No. 2964, provides all
United States personnel connected with the installations (including dependents) immunity from
Ethiopian criminal jurisdiction. Accordingly, these two agreements are not considered to be
SOFAs as the term is used in this paper. See generally G. STAMBU, supra note 42, at 51-73;
Metzger and McMahon, The Return of United States Servicemen for Offenses Committed
Overseas, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 617, 632-37 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Metzger and McMa-
hon].
51 Only the Japanese SOFAs follow the NATO SOFA in limiting the primary right of the United
States military authorities to exercise jurisdiction over servicemen and civilian employees alone.
Former Japanese SOFA, para. 3(a); Japanese SOFA, art. XVII, para. 3(a). Nearly all the other
SOFAs extend the primary right to the United States under the same circumstances over depen-
dents. See, e.g., Icelandic SOFA, art. 2, para. 4(a); Pakistani SOFA, Annex B, para. 3(a); West
Indies SOFA, art. IX, para. 3(a); Philippine SOFA, Annex, para. 3(b). This extension of primary
jurisdiction is largely theoretical in view of the lack of military jurisdiction over civilians in
peacetime. See cases cited note 18 supra. The Japanese and other SOFAs also extend jurisdiction
to the United States over any American servicemen present in the territory concerned, a privilege
not expressly granted in the NATO SOFA which covers only members of an armed force present
in the receiving state "in connexion (sic) with their official duties." NATO SOFA, art. I, para.
I(a). See LAZAREFF, supra note 20, at 266. Japanese SOFA, art. I (a). See, e.g., Korean SOFA,
art. I(a) (except servicemen attached to the American Embassy or the Military Advisory Group);
Philippine SOFA, Agreed Official Minutes, para. I (only those persons subject to the military law
of the United States regularly assigned to the Philippines or present in the Philippines in connection
with the presence there of the U.S. bases).
The Libyan SOFA, art. XX, para.(1), in effect immunizes both military and civilian personnel,
including dependents, from Libyan jurisdiction in the categories of offenses where the United
States would have primary jurisdiction under NATO SOFA, art. VII, para. 3(a). In addition
immunity exists for the serviceman and his civilian compatriots for offenses "committed solely
within the agreed areas." Libyan SOFA, art. XX, para. 1(c). In all other cases Libyan courts "shall
exercise jurisdiction unless . . . Libya waives its right to exercise jurisdiction." Id. at para. 1. In
the expired Pakistani SOFA, Annex B, para. 3 (a)(iii), the United States has the primary right to
exercise jurisdiction over offenses committed in the agreed areas.
The provisions on jurisdiction in the New Zealand SOFA, Memorandum of Understanding,
para. 4(a) are unique:
If United States personnel are alleged to have committed acts which are offences against
New Zealand law, the following provisions shall apply:
(i) The New Zealand authorities, recognizing the problems arising from concur-
rent jurisdiction in criminal matters over such personnel in New Zealand
territory, will consider alleged offences affecting only United States personnel
or property, or committed in the performance of official duty, as a matter
for the United States authorities.
(ii) Moreover, the New Zealand authorities will not ordinarily be concerned to
institute proceedings in New Zealand courts in respect of alleged minor off-
ences which do not fall within the categories referred to in (i) above.
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making a determination that the alleged offense was committed in the
performance of official duty are beyond the scope of this paper and have
been fully discussed elsewhere." When a decision is made that the
authorities of the receiving state will exercise jurisdiction, there remains
a problem in insuring that the accused individual is available for the
receiving state's officials and courts to effectively pursue their criminal
processes.
1. Arrest and Custody Provisions of the SOFAs
The negotiators of NATO SOFA provided for the actual handling of
personnel accused of offenses in relatively brief terms compared to the
detailed provisions that would appear in later SOFAs where the United
States was the only party which had armed forces, civilian components,
and dependents of members falling in those categories"4 whose rights
and obligations were defined by the agreements.
Under paragraph 5 of Article VII of NATO SOFA, the authorities
of both the receiving and sending states are obliged to "assist each other
in the arrest" of. military and civilian personnel connected with the
armed services "in the territory of the receiving state and in handing
them over to the authority which is to exercise jurisdiction." 5 Whenever
a uniformed serviceman or a civilian employed by the sending state's
armed forces5" "is in the hands of the sending State," that state is
51 See LAZAREFF, supra note 20, at 128-208; J. SNEE & K. PYE, supra note 32, at 24-33, 41-
91; Stanger, supra note 42, at 185-245. See also J. DODD, supra note 51, at 40-43.
" The categories of personnel whose status is defined in the SOFAs are essentially the same
but the denomination differs somewhat from SOFA to SOFA and results in inclusion or exclusion
of particular individuals. Generally, American servicemen present in the receiving state are encom-
passed by the SOFAs although they may be required to be present because of official duty. See
note 52 supra. Civilian personnel who are employed by the military forces or organizations form
a second category and are normally termed "members of the civilian component." See NATO
SOFA, art. I, para. l(b). In NATO countries, except Iceland, the civilian employees may be
nationals of any NATO country except the receiving state. Id. In some other countries they must
be American nationals or citizens. See, e.g., Korean SOFA, art. I(b); Spanish SOFA, Definitions,
para. 2(a)(2). Dependents of both military personnel and civilian employees covered by the agree-
ment are generally included in SOFA's coverage regardless of the nationality they may have.
NATO SOFA, art. I, para. l(c) (spouse or child depending on the member for support); Australian
SOFA, art. I (spouse or other relative depending upon the member for support). But see Icelandic
SOFA, art. I, which excludes any Icelandic national from the coverage of the SOFA. See generally
J. SNEE & K. PYE, supra note 32, at 11-20.
5 NATO SOFA, art. VII, para. 5(a).
" Serviceman, member of the Armed Forces, civilian employee, civilian employed by the Armed
Forces and like terms are used in the text of this paper rather than the precise language of each
particular SOFA, the text of which should be consulted to determine precisely who is covered. See
note 54 supra.
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [VOL. 5: 1
entitled to retain custody of the individual "until he is charged by the
receiving State."57
The provisions of the NATO SOFA with respect to requiring cooper-
ation between the sending state's military authorities and local authori-
ties in arresting and handing over individuals to the state which will
exercise jurisdiction are followed almost uniformly in all the subsequent
SOFAs to which the United States is a party. All of the current agree-
ments indicate that the cooperation in the arrest will occur in the terri-
tory of the country involved." Some limit the cooperation to the extent
permitted by any law applicable to the authorities so cooperating." The
clause requiring the handing over of arrested personnel does not appear
in the Spanish SOFA but other provisions therein seemingly cover any
gap created by this omission.6'
The right of the United States, or sending state, to obtain or retain
custody over offenders who are part of the overseas military community
finds extensive variations in the later SOFAs. While the NATO and
Japanese SOFAs limit the right of the sending state to have custody of
military personnel and civilian employees already in its custody, and
only until such an accused is charged, 2 the primary provisions of the
other agreements extend this right to dependents subject to military law
and in many cases beyond the time of charging or indictment.6 3 Even
31 NATO SOFA, art. VII, para. 5(c).
1 Id. at para. 5(a). See, e.g., Korean SOFA, art. XXII, para. 5 (a). But see Chinese SOFA,
art. XIV, para. 5(a), which indicates that the handing over is to be to the authorities entitled to
custody.
0 Japanese SOFA, art. XVII, para. 5(a); Nicaraguan SOFA, art. IX, para. 4(a); West Indies
SOFA, art. IX, para. 5(a); Bahamian SOFA, art. VI, para. 5(a); Indian Ocean SOFA, Annex II,
para. l(e)(i); Seychelles SOFA, para. 10(e)(i); Australian SOFA, art. 8, para. 5(a); Philippine
SOFA, para. 5(a); Chinese SOFA, art. XIV, para. 5(a); Korean SOFA, art. XXII, para. 5(a);
Spanish SOFA, art. XVIII, para. i. The Icelandic SOFA, art. 2, para. 6(a) does not limit coopera-
tion in the arrest to Icelandic territory. Neither does either of the effectively expired SOFAs.
Pakistani SOFA, Annex B, para. 5(a); Libyan SOFA, art. XX, para. 3. The New Zealand SOFA,
Memorandum of Understandings, para. 4(c) states "the United States authorities ...will take
whatever steps are necessary to punish personnel who have committed acts which are offences
against [New Zealand] laws."
so West Indies SOFA, art. IX, para. 5(a); Bahamian SOFA, art. VI, para. 5(a); Indian Ocean
SOFA, Annex II, para. l(e)(i); Seychelles SOFA, para. 10(e)(i); Chinese SOFA, art. XIV, para.
5(a) (within the limits of their authority); Spanish SOFA, art. XVIII, para. I (within the limits of
their respective legal powers).
61 Spanish SOFA, art. XVIII. See Appendix B.
62 NATO SOFA, art. VII, para. 5(c); Former Japanese SOFA, para. 5 (c); Japanese SOFA,
art. XIV, para. 5(c). See J. SNEa & K. PYE..supra note 32. at 92-93.
" Icelandic SOFA, art. 2, para. 6(c) (until charging); Libyan SOFA, art. XX, para. 4 (on the
United States authorities' undertaking to present him to the Libyan courts for investigatory pro-
ceedings and trial when required); Nicaraguan SOFA, art. IX, para. 4(c) (pending completion of
judicial proceedings); Pakistani SOFA, Annex B, para. 5(c) (same as Nicarguan SOFA); Austra-
lian SOFA, art. 8, para. 5(c) (until he is charged); Chinese SOFA, art. XIV, para. 5(c) (pending
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with Japan, an Agreed Minute to the SOFA envisions that dependents
as well as servicemen and civilian employees may be released to United
States custody by Japanese officials until indictment or request for the
return of such custody. 4 The Korean, Chinese and Spanish SOFAs all
contemplate that the United States may retain or obtain the custody of
military and civilian personnel until the completion of all appellate
proceedings. 5 Some actually require the receiving state to entrust the
individual to United States' military authorities without any specific
request 6 and the Philippine SOFA requires the officer so obtaining
custody to certify the receipt of the accused, his availability for investi-
gation and trial, and that he will be produced before the competent court
when required. 7 The Korean SOFA similarly requires the United States
authorities to make any individual, over whom it is exercising custody,
promptly available to Korean authorities for trial and investigation."6
The recent Spanish SOFA varies the language of the custody provi-
sions extensively in comparison to other SOFAs. The United States is
entitled to the custody of all persons covered by the SOFA who are
"legally subject to detention by the military authorities of the United
States" until their "surrender is requested . .. for the execution of
sentence."'" To the extent permitted by United States military law, the
American authorities are to give "full consideration to decisions of the
competent Spanish authorities regarding conditions of custody." The
same officials are to "guarantee" the "immediate appearance" of any
conclusion of all judicial proceedings); Korean SOFA, art. XXII, para. 5(c) (same as Chinese
SOFA); Spanish SOFA, art. XVIII, para. 3 (until the conclusion of all judicial proceedings and,
when appropriate, until his surrender is requested by the competent Spanish authorities).
The SOFAs with the United Kingdom specify a right of United States custody until the individ-
ual is charged, but apparently also contemplate that the United States may have custody pending
completion of judicial proceedings by providing that in such cases the United States shall make
the accused immediately available for investigation or trial proceedings. West Indies SOFA, art.
IX, para. 5(c); Bahamian SOFA, art. VI, para. 5(c); Indian Ocean SOFA, Annex II, para. I(e)(iii);
Seychelles SOFA, para. 10(e)(iii). See also New Zealand SOFA, Memorandum of
Understandings, para. 4(c).
" Former Japanese SOFA, Agreed Official Minutes, Re paragraph 5, para. I; Japanese SOFA;
Agreed Official Minutes, Article XVII, Re paragraph 5, para. I.
U Korean SOFA, art. XXII, para. 5(c); Chinese SOFA, art. XIV, para. 5(c); Spanish SOFA,
art. XVIII, para. 3 (if the person is "legally subject to detention by the military authorities of the
United States").
" Chinese SOFA, art. XIV, para. 5(c).
Philippine SOFA, Agreed Official Minutes, para. 5. This provision was contained in the main
text of the Philippine Bases Agreement, art. XVII, para. 5.
61 Korean SOFA, art. XXII, para. 5(c). A similar provision is contained in all SOFAs where
the right of the United States to custody extends beyond the time of charging. See, e.g., Pakistani
SOFA, Annex B, para. 5(c); Chinese SOFA, art. XIV, para. 5(c). See Appendix B.
0 Spanish SOFA, art. XVIII, para. 3.
1975]
16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [VOL. 5: 1
such accused "in any proceedings that may require his presence, and,
in any case, his appearance at the trial. '70
2. Provisions of Agreements Supplementing NA TO SOFA
The United States has entered into four executive agreements with
three nations that modify, inter alia, the custodial provisions of the
multilateral NATO SOFA. A 1954 pact with the Netherlands gives the
United States the responsibility for the custody of all individuals subject
to its military law pending trial.7 ' American authorities are to make
such individuals "immediately available to Netherlands authorities
upon their request for purposes of investigation and trial. ' 72 As in many
SOFAs the United States authorities are also required to consider the
requests of the Dutch authorities "as to the way in which custody should
be carried out."7 3
In an agreement with the Greek Government, the United States au-
thorities are to "take custody of the accused pending completion of trial
proceedings," and to maintain the custody in Greece. 7' The personnel
envisioned as accused include not only the uniformed servicemen and
civilian employees serving in Greece, but also their dependents and those
"who are temporarily present in Greece." 5 This last category would
include military and civilian personnel connected with American armed
forces visiting Greece in a leave status; such personnel are not encom-
passed in NATO SOFA unless their presence in the receiving state is
"in connection with their official duties. '76
The most important supplementary agreement to NATO SOFA for
the United States, primarily because of the large number of American
personnel affected,77 is the agreement with the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, adhered to by six other NATO countries.78 Under this agreement,
7 Id.
1, Agreement Concerning Stationing of United States Armed Forces in the Netherlands, Aug.
13, 1954, Annex, para. 3, [1954] 6 U.S.T. 103, 106, T.I.A.S. No. 3174,4 [hereinafter cited as Dutch
Supplementary Agreement].
7 Id. See Appendix B.
3Id.
74 Agreement Concerning the Status of United States Forces in Greece, Sept. 7, 1956, art. III,
para. 1, [1956] 7 U.S.T. 2555, 2558, T.I.A.S. No. 3649, 4 [hereinafter cited as Greek Supplemen-
tary Agreement].
75 Id. at art. I, para. 2.
71 NATO SOFA, art. I.
" In early 1970 Senator Percy stated that about 220,000 of 310,000 American servicemen in
Europe were stationed in West Germany, and that the American military community in Europe
also included 14,000 civilian personnel and 235,000 dependents. 116 CONG. REc. 4254 (1970).
" Agreement to Supplement the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty
Regarding the Status of their Forces with Respect to Foreign Forces Stationed in the Federal
STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS
West Germany waives its primary right to exercise jurisdiction in all
cases that it would have such a right under NATO SOFA, subject only
to a possibility of recalling the waiver within twenty-one days following
the notification by the United States of the individual case involved."
Even if the waiver is recalled, the United States is entitled in nearly all
cases 0 to obtain the custody of all servicemen, civilian employees and
dependents whom the German authorities have arrested and to retain
custody of most of those same personnel which American authorities
arrest."' The custody is to remain with American authorities until the
German authorities release or acquit the accused, or until the "comm-
encement of the sentence, '8 2 a term contemplating the exhaustion of the
appellate system. As in the Dutch agreement, American authorities
are to consider requests regarding custody made by competent German
authorities.8 4 They are also to "make the arrested person available...
for investigation and criminal proceedings and to take all appropriate
measures to that end and to prevent any prejudice to the course of
justice (Verdunkelungsgefahr)."
In a separate bilateral agreement with the United States, the Federal
Republic extended the coverage of most of both the NATO SOFA and
the Supplementary Agreement to American servicemen and civilian
employees stationed in Europe and North Africa and dependents who
accompany them on leave in West Germany.8s
3. The Right of the United States to Custody
From the foregoing provisions in the various SOFAs and supplemen-
tary agreements, the sending state, which would normally be the United
States, has acquired explicit rights that should be recognized under
Republic of Germany, Aug. 3, 1959, [1963] 14 U.S.T. 531, T.I.A.S. No. 5351 [hereinafter cited
as German Supplementary Agreement]. Denmark initially participated in the negotiations but did
not sign the agreement. Text of Negotiating History, supra note 20, at 1, 291. Current parties to
the German Supplementary Agreement are Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN
FORCE 290 (1972).
" German Supplementary Agreement, art. 19.
s0 German authorities have the right to custody in the case of "offenses directed solely against
the security of the Federal Republic." Id. at art. 22, para. 2(c).
s Id. at art. 22.
I d. at para. 3.
3 Text of Negotiating History, supra note 20, at 1003.
U German Supplementary Agreement, art. 22, para. 3.
8 Id.
U Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany on the Status of Persons on Leave, Aug.
3, 1959, [1963] 14 U.S.T. 689, 694, T.I.A.S. No. 5352, 6 [hereinafter cited as German Leave
Agreement].
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international law to have authorities of its armed forces exercise physi-
cal control over its military members and certain civilians connected
with its military establishment during pretrial and often appellate pro-
ceedings of courts of another sovereign state. The custodial provisions
in the executive agreements subsequent to NATO SOFA reveal a grow-
ing tendency to clarify and expand these rights both as to the length of
time involved and the category of personnel to whom this right applies. 87
Somewhat surprisingly, the agreements expanded these custody rights
for the United States as well as its jurisdictional priorities during the
same time that the United States Supreme Court curtailed the right of
the armed forces to exercise court-martial jurisdiction over civilian per-
sonnel. 81 In large part, the willingness of the receiving state to agree to
more extensive American custody may have resulted from a realization
that pretrial custody is separate from the exercise of criminal jurisdic-
tion and the infliction of punishment,89 as well as the insistence of the
American negotiators, who were faced with a Senate resolution indicat-
ing that the provisions of NATO SOFA were only the minimal accep-
table terms and should not be repeated in future arrangements. 0 As a
practical matter, it is not unlikely that local foreign authorities were
probably satisfied to be rid of the burden of the accused during pretrial
proceedings.9 The anxiety of persons awaiting trial reputedly creates
more severe custodial problems and this would only be aggravated in
the case of individuals not fluent in his custodians' own tongue. 2
In some of the countries where American forces were stationed, local
authorities at times permitted American military authorities to retain
custody beyond the time when the actual right to custody of the accused
terminated.93 The regulations promulgated jointly by all three Ameri-
can Armed Services, which purport to implement the Senate Resolution
that accompanied the ratification of the NATO SOFA, encouraged this
trend by requiring overseas commanders not only to attempt to obtain
waivers in every case possible, whether the accused is military or civil-
ian, but also to seek to retain custody of accused military personnel as
long as possible.94
'7 See pp. 14-17 supra.
U See Supreme Court cases cited note 18 supra.
" Stanger, supra note 42, at 256.
8 99 CONG. REc. 8370 (1953).
" Stanger, supra note 42, at 253.
" See Approved Draft, ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to Pretrial
Release 2-3 (1968).
13 LAZAREFF, supra note 20, at 241; Stanger, supra note 42, at 253-56; Metzger and McMahon,
supra note 51, at 636. See United States ex rel. Stone v. Robinson, 309 F. Supp. 1261, 1267 (W.D.
Pa. 1970).
" Status of Forces Policies, Procedures, and Information, Air Force Reg. No. 110-12, Army
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4. The Military View of the Right to Custody
Despite the acquisition under the agreements of the right to exercise
custody over both military and civilian personnel, the Armed Services
have been reluctant to recognize the right thus gained as any authority
under United States law for American military authorities actually to
exercise such custody."5 In overseas areas, it is customary Army practice
for charges under the Uniform Code of Military Justice to be preferred
against military personnel whenever the receiving state might exercise
its right to exercise jurisdiction." Such an event provides military au-
thorities with a theoretically sufficient and independent ground to exer-
cise pretrial restraint, since the Code requires that persons charged with
an offense be ordered into arrest or confinement." Another provision
of the same article also requires that immediate steps be thereafter
taken to bring the case to trial or to dismiss the charges. 8 This require-
ment is apparently not felt to be compulsory as long as the United
States can not exercise its jurisdiction without violating the delineations
of priority in the SOFAs. Since there is no basis for preference of
charges against civilians, such as civilian employees overseas or depen-
dents accompanying the servicemen," the services have refused to exer-
cise custody of such personnel'01 in spite of indications in some SOFAs
that the custody of the accused civilian must be entrusted to military
authorities. 0'
The position of the armed forces in refusing to consider the SOFA
provisions as grounds for the military authorities to actually exercise
custody has been recently questioned by one commentator. However,
his position that the SOFAs provide ample basis and authority for
pretrial confinement or other forms of custodial control of both civilian
and military personnel while they are in the receiving state, without the
necessity of preferring American charges, has not yet been adopted by
the services. 02
Reg. No. 27-50, SECNAV Instruction 5820.4C, 28 June 1967, para. 4 [hereinafter cited as AR
27-501.
Id. See Heath, Status of Forces Agreements as a Basis for United States Custody of an
Accused, 49 MIL. L. REv. 45, 84-85 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Heath].
" Heath, supra note 95, at 87-88.
10 U.S.C. § 810 (1970).
" Id.
' See cases cited note 18 supra.
"7* See Heath, supra note 95, at 84-85.
"I See, e.g., Pakistani SOFA, Annex B, para. 5(c); Chinese SOFA, art. XIV, para. 5(c); Dutch
Supplementary Agreement, Annex, para. 5(c); Dutch Supplementary Agreement, Annex, para. 3;
Greek Supplementary Agreement, art. III.
"* Heath, supra note 95. See AR 27-50, para. 4.
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As explained by the commentator disagreeing with the Army posi-
tion, one rationale for denying that SOFAs permit military incarcera-
tion of personnel is the permissive nature of the SOFA provisions' 3 in
contrast to the mandatory terms of the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice that compel some form of custody for personnel accused of offenses
thereunder.' 0 ' It has also been posited that the SOFAs are not self-
executing in their custodial provisions and some form of legislation by
the United States would be necessary to permit the Armed Forces to
implement such custody. 05 Another arguable reason for failing to exer-
cise custody could be that, except for the basic NATO SOFA which
permits custody of only servicemen and employees and only for the
limited period prior to the charging of an accused,'"6 there is no Con-
gressional ratification of the SOFAs by a formal treaty method'0 or
other means, such as an appropriation of funds to support such cus-
tody. 08 Congress has actually recognized the SOFAs to some degree by
providing for the costs of local counsel for personnel subject to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice who are being tried in foreign
courts.'19 When this provision was first enacted, the civilians whose
status was defined in the SOFAs were generally subject to the Code, or
thought to be so." 0
The effect of the military attitude toward custody of personnel not
actually in an Armed Service has been to deny civilian personnel over-
seas the benefit of American custody, as foreign authorities are forced
to exercise their custodial powers if restraint is deemed necessary."'
This may result in more severe treatment for a civilian forced to stay
in foreign pretrial confinement since the SOFAs ordinarily permit the
military authorities of the United States to determine what form cus-
113 Heath, supra note 95, at 87-88.
1- 10 U.S.C. § 810 (1970).
' Heath, supra note 93, at 77.
'0 NATO SOFA, art. VII, para. 5(c).
'W U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, ci. 2. The recent action of the United States in restoring full
Japanese sovereignty to the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) may possibly be interpreted as ratification
of the Japanese SOFA. The treaty provides that all treaties applicable to Japan under the Defense
Treaty of 1960 apply to Okinawa and one article specifically mentions the Japanese SOFA.
Agreement with Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Island, June 17, 1971, arts.
II, III, [1972] 23 U.S.T. 447, T.I.A.S. No. 7314, 5.
108 Heath, supra note 95, at 64-71.
1- 10 U.S.C. § 1037 (1970).
110 Id. This provision was originally enacted in 1956 before the decisions cited in note 18 supra
had invalidated the portions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice purporting to grant court-
martial jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the armed forces overseas. Act of July 24, 1956,
ch. 689, 70 Stat. 630, 10 U.S.C. § 802 (11-12) (1970).
.1, Heath, sunra note 95, at 87-88.
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tody should take."' Military personnel are thus subjected to pretrial
confinement or other forms of custody under the fiction that their depri-
vation of liberty is justified by charges which can not be tried without
the violation by the United States of the SOFA involved.
C. Termination of the Sending State's Custody
Although the custodial provisions in the various agreements make
expressly clear that the sending state has a right superior to that of the
receiving state to have its military authorities retain physical control
over most members of the overseas military communities during all or
part of the pretrial and appellate processes of foreign courts, there are
no explicit provisions requiring the sending state to surrender the ac-
cused at the termination of this period.' There are, however, in most
of the SOFAs subsequent to NATO SOFA and in the supplementary
agreements provisions requiring the sending state's military authorities
to make accused personnel available for investigative proceedings and
trials."4
The lack of any clear provision indicating that such custody of an
accused as the military authorities may possess and exercise must be
transferred to the receiving state for imposition of punishment or fol-
lowing charging or trial, should not justify a sending state's refusal to
surrender the accused after its right to custody has expired. The provi-
sions in most agreements requiring the United States as a sending state
to assist the receiving state in handing the accused over to the state
which is to exercise jurisdiction"' would not seem to expire or terminate
when the receiving state actually exercises that jurisdiction or acquires
the accused temporarily for investigation or trial.
Both with the agreements indicating that the handing over is to be to
the state exercising jurisdiction and with those where the handing over
is to be to the state entitled to custody,"' the end of the sending state's
right to custody naturally infers that the individual should be surren-
dered to the receiving state's authorities to permit the exercise of juris-
"12 While NATO SOFA, art. VII, para. 5(c), is silent on the form that custody should take, most
SOFAs allow the United States or the sending state to determine the manner in which custody
will be exercised after considering any special desires of local authorities. See, e.g., Korean SOFA,
art. XXII, para. 5 (c); German Supplementary Agreement, art. 22, para. 3. See Appendix B.
"1 A broad reading of the custody provisions would probably infer that custody must be
transferred to the receiving state at the termination of the right of the sending state or the United
States to continue such custody. See Metzger and McMahon, supra note 51, at 637.
"' See note 68 supra.
115 See p. 14 supra.
" Chinese SOFA, art. XXII, para. 5(c). See Philippine SOFA, Agreed Official Minutes, para.
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diction to be completed by such methods as infliction of adjudged pun-
ishment. Denying the sending state the right to impose punishment duly
adjudged on a person within its territory after it has pursued its criminal
processes would render the criminal jurisdiction provisions meaningless,
abrogating their spirit if not any of their precise terms. Certainly where
the sending state has custody of an accused within the territory of the
receiving state, the superior sovereignty of the local state should compel
the military authorities to submit to the receiving state's desire when
those authorities no longer have a legitimate claim to custody of the
individual by virtue of any international agreement.
The validity of this implied obligation to surrender an accused after
the sending state's right to custody expires was quite abruptly upheld
by the Supreme Court in the case of Wilson v. Girard"7 involving a
soldier in Japan. Girard was accused of shooting a Japanese woman at
a firing range while he was performing guard duties. The certificate of
Girard's commander indicating that the offense occurred in the per-
formance of official duties and was thus one over which American
authorities had the primary right to exercise jurisdiction was disputed
by Japanese authorities. Lengthy negotiations resulted in United States
representatives agreeing to waive their primary right. "8 In a petition for
habeas corpus commenced in the District of Columbia, Girard obtained
an injunction prohibiting officials in the Defense Department from sur-
rendering him to Japanese authorities for trial. The federal district judge
determined that the United States could not constitutionally deprive an
accused of trial by court-martial for an offense covered by the Uniform
Code."9 In an appeal bypassing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court
reversed. Holding that under traditional international law Japan has
"exclusive jurisdiction to punish all offenses against its laws committed
within its borders"2 0 and that its surrender of such jurisdiction for
official duty offenses was conditioned by a clause requiring the United
States to give sympathetic consideration to Japanese requests for
waiver, the Court perceived no Constitutional or statutory barrier to the
application of the waiver to Girard's situation.' The per curiam opin-
-1 354 U.S. 524 (1957), revg Girard v. Wilson, 152 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1957). The writ for
habeas corpus was filed for Girard in the District Court on June 6, 1957; the District Court
announced its decision on June 18 and the Supreme Court its per curiam opinion on July 11, 1957.
See Baldwin, Foreign Jurisdiction and the American Soldier, 1958 Wis. L. REV. 52, 65 [hereinafter
cited as Baldwin).
"S Girard v. Wilson, 152 F. Supp. 21, 23 (D.D.C. 1957).
HI Id. at 27.
' Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957).
' Id. at 530.
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ion did not hold that the Japanese SOFA compelled surrender of Girard
to Japan, but the Court must have determined that such a surrender was
permitted by its dissolution of the lower court's injunction prohibiting
a delivery of Girard to Japanese authorities.'
The implicit approval in the Girard case of surrender to receiving
states conformed with the holding of two previous lower court cases
refusing any relief to servicemen overseas about to be delivered to for-
eign authorities.2 3 No subsequent cases have successfully attacked any
proposed or already effected surrender of servicemen to foreign authori-
ties pursuant to this implied obligation of any SOFA, where the surren-
der was to take place and the individual was in the foreign country.',
Thus the normal application of SOFA provisions, where the individ-
ual commits the offense overseas and remains in the receiving state from
the time of offense until the completion of any adjudged punishment,
presents few problems. The sending state in exercising custody is equiva-
lent to an agent of the criminal authorities of the receiving state,'1
possessing the right and sometimes the obligation of maintaining
pretrial and appellate custody in the manner it deems appropriate,", and
relinquishing the accused to the receiving state authorities if and when
that state's courts convict the accused and his surrender is requested to
serve any adjudged punishment.
While the Girard holding in the Supreme Court contained language
limiting its application to the particular circumstances involved in the
waiver of jurisdiction by the United States and the subsequent necessity
to deliver the accused to Japanese authorities, the case has been broadly
interpreted as judicial approval of the SOFAs in all respects.'" Whether
or not this expanded reading is justified, the surrender of individuals in
the custody of the United States within the territory of a receiving state
to local officials does seem legally unimpeachable, if not based upon a
SOFA, upon the principle recognized by the Supreme Court of the
I"t Id.
'2 Cozart v. Wilson, 236 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1956), vacated as moot, 352 U.S. 884 (1956);
May v. Wilson, 153 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1956). Cf United States ex. rel. Keefe v. Dulles, 222
F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied 348 U.S. 952 (1955).
"I Smallwood v. Clifford, 286 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1968), vacated as moot, No. 22053 (D.C.
Cir. May 14, 1969); Blount v. Laird, Memorandum Order, Civil Action No. 2715-70 (D.C. Cir.
Oct. 29, 1971).
' ' PROCEEDINGS: FIRST SUMMER CONFERENCE ON INT'L LAW, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL 92
(1957) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
121 Chinese SOFA, art. XIV, para. 5(c); German Supplementary Agreement, art. 22. See Text
of Negotiating History, supra note 20, at 463.
- See Note, 71 HARV. L. REV. 136, 140-41 (1957-58). See also Metzger and McMahon, supra
note 51, at 644; but see id. at 625 n.38.
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sovereignty of the receiving state and its general right to punish offend-
ers within its borders for offenses therein committed. 2 8
III. SENDING STATE'S OBLIGATION To RETURN FUGITIVES
While the operation of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the SOFAs
may proceed smoothly enough in a routine case where the accused
military member or civilian subjected to the criminal processes of the
receiving state remains within the territory of that state from the time
of the commission of the offense through the trial and imposition of any
adjudged punishment, there remains the constant possibility of his de-
parture. In this respect the individual is not unlike any criminal seeking
to avoid the consequences of his crime by fleeing the jurisdiction which
desires to subject him to its criminal powers. In the case of a serviceman
or civilian connected with a military community, the departure may
actually be facilitated by military movements or aircraft flights to which
the local resident or ordinary alien would have less likelihood of access.
Regardless of the form of custody exercised over an accused and
whether it is exercised by foreign military authorities or local officials,
an accused could escape at any time prior to the end of his prison
sentence. 29 Conceivably he could flee or passively accept a reassignment
from the sending state before his complicity in the offense is discovered
and effective steps taken to insure his presence.130 Finally, as has occa-
sionally occurred, military authorities responsible for exercising custody
may fail to take the proper steps to insure that an accused kept under a
loose restrictive custody remains assigned to a unit in the receiving state
permitting him to depart on a normal reassignment or for discharge
back in the sending state.' 3'
None of these possible events has much, if any, relevance to the
I" Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957).
M See, e.g., United States ex. rel. Stone v. Robinson, 309 F. Supp. 1261 (W.D. Pa. 1970);
Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1972). These two cases are described in Chapter IV
in ra.
'I See, e.g., J. DODD, supra note 51, at 59, describing the departure of a naval enlisted man
from the Philippines where the local arresting authorities had apparently released him without
formally turning him over to United States naval authorities. Before the trial the man was returned
to the United States and discharged.
"' See, e.g., Williams v. Rogers, 449 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1971). This case is described in Chapter
IV infra. See also J. DODD, supra note 51, at 58-59, describing the case of George E. Roe, a naval
seaman who was formally released to American authorities but permitted to return to the United
States for discharge because of a failure to stop his orders; PROCEEDINGS, supra note 125, at 96,
where a former Judge Advocate General of the United States Army indicated in 1957 that either
a soldier or an airman had been inadvertantly returned to the United States and was thereafter
taken back to France after a high level decision.
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criminality of the individual although the act of departure may be an
offense in itself and the statute of limitations may be affected. While it
may have been logical and prudent for drafters of the SOFAs to take
specific notice of these possible events and to provide for remedial ac-
tion for their occurrence, there are no explicit provisions in the SOFAs
or supplementary agreements covering this area.",
A. Applicability of Extradition Treaties
The most common method of dealing with individuals who flee a
country to avoid prosecution or punishment is, of course, extradition.
The individual whose status is or was defined by a SOFA would not,
by virtue of that status, appear to be exempt from the coverage of such
treaties.' If he leaves the receiving state and is found in any other
state having an extradition treaty with the receiving state, that other
state should be able to extradite the accused to the receiving state unless
the alleged offense is exempt from extradition, as are most political
offenses,' 3 14 or because of other factors such as the accused's possession
of the nationalty of the state requested to make the extradition.s3
Extradition, however, is a somewhat cumbersome procedure,",
which normally involves judicial hearings'37 and the necessary delay
involved in obtaining adequate evidence.' In the United States the
approval of the Secretary of State must be obtained after the judicial
proceedings 39 and still further delay can be effected through habeas
corpus proceedings, other collateral remedies, and appeals from such
cases.' The presently effective United States extradition treaties are
"I None of the SOFAs or supplementary agreements have any explicit words indicating that
an individual in any circumstances must be returned from a sending state, or any other location,
to the receiving state if he leaves such state during the processing of his case. The purpose of this
Chapter is to determine whether other provisions can be read so as to imply or infer that the sending
state has a duty to return such individuals.
'3 See, e.g., Extradition Treaty with Japan, supra note 22, at art. II.
Im See generally M. GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGHT
73-94 (1956).
13 See generally RAFUSE, supra note 7; SHEARER, supra note 7, at 93-131.
'3 Bassiouni, International Extradition in American Practice and World Public Order, 36
TENN. L. REV. I, 28 (1968). Contra, Comment, Toward the Elimination of the Legal Non-Person
from International Extradition, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 410, 426 (1970).
1 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1970).
'31 Id. at §§ 3188, 3190.
'3 Id. at § 3186.
"I Wacker v. Bisson, 370 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 936 (1967). An earlier
appeal in this case of an extradition to Canada for securities offenses had resulted in Wacker being
permitted to seek a declaratory judgment invalidating the proposed extradition after two unsuccess-
ful habeas corpus attempts. Wacker v. Bisson, 348 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1965). The original extradi-
tion proceedings had begun in April, 1963, four years before the Supreme Court acted on the last
appeal. Id. at 604, 387 U.S. 936 (1967).
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limited to specifically enumerated offenses and do not cover the whole
range of possible criminal conduct as do the SOFAs. 14 t Usually most
of the common law felonies such as murder, rape and robbery are
included."'
A more difficult obstacle to the use of extradition treaties to return
an individual to the receiving state from the United States is the failure
of many such treaties to permit, under the interpretation of the Supreme
Court, extradition of American citizens.1 3 In the case of countries with
which the United States has both a SOFA relationship and an extradi-
tion treaty, Americans can not be extradited to Belgium, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal and Turkey. " There are no presently effective extra-
dition treaties with China, Denmark, the Philippines or South Korea.'
With the aforementioned countries, if one assumes that most American
servicemen and civilians accompanying them abroad are Americans,
extradition is presently unavailable. Extradition of such individuals is
permissible in the case of France, Japan, New Zealand, Nicaragua and
Spain.' Extradition of American citizens is mandatory in the absence
"I See generally treaties listed notes 14, 21 and 22 supra; SHEARER, supra note 7, at 133-37.
The United States is a party to the Convention on Extradition (Inter-American), Dec. 26, 1933,
[1935149 Stat. 3111, T.S. No. 882, to which eleven Latin American countries are also a party. In
the Convention, extradition is to take place if the act constitutes a crime punishable under the laws
of both the demanding and surrendering state by imprisonment for more than dne year. Id. at art.
2. Because the Convention does not apply between any two of the signatories when they have. a
bilateral extradition treaty and the United States does have such treaties with all other parties,
the Convention has no practical effect in the United States. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN
FORCE 314 (1973).
142 See, e.g., Extradition Treaty with Japan, supra note 22, at art. VI. This treaty was modified
by a later Extradition Treaty with Japan, May 17, 1906, [19061 34 Stat. 2951, T.S. No. 454, to
include simple larceny when the crime is punishable in both Japan and the United States by
imprisonment for one year or more. Also included was an actual conviction with at least one year
imprisonment as a sentence.
I" Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936). See generally RAFUSE,
supra note 7, at 32-55.
"I See note 21 supra. At the time of NATO SOFA's negotiations, the United States had in effect
the Extradition Treaty with Denmark, Jan. 6, 1902 [1903] 32 Stat. 1906, T.S. No. 405, which also
contained the clause interpreted to bar surrender of nationals. Denmark and the United States
terminated that treaty effective June 18, 1968. 7 J. BEVANS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1776-1949, 38 (1971). A new extradition treaty
with Denmark has been signed but is still pending submission to and approval by the Senate. Dep't
State Press Release No. 1726, 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 130 (1972).
"I U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (1973). With respect to Denmark, see note 144
supra.
" See note 22 supra. Prior to 1970 New Zealand was covered by previous treaties with the
United Kingdom and thus extradition would have been mandatory absent some disqualifying factor
other than the nationality of the fugitive. See note 14 supra.
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of some other ground for exemption in the case of Australia, Canada,
Great Britain and Italy." 7
It is thus apparent that extradition may be totally ineffective in a
large number of cases where an individual encompassed by a SOFA
manages to leave the receiving state before his alleged crime is ade-
quately disposed of by that state. Some of the cases may be resolved
by the exercise of American jurisdiction (if any exists) since the SOFAs
do not prohibit such outside the receiving state." 8 The difficulty of
obtaining witnesses may, however, make this possibility practically inef-
fective. Since the United States follows the principle that individuals
will not be surrendered to a foreign state absent a treaty obligation to
do so or an authorizing statute,"' and there is no statute presently
permitting extradition to any SOFA country,5 0 any requirement to re-
turn the fugitive individual1"' to the receiving state must be found, if at
all, in the SOFA.
B. Use of the SOFAs to Return Any Fugitive
If the SOFAs and the supplementary agreements had as a primary
purpose the suppression of crime, the normal stated desire of an extradi-
tion treaty,' it would be logical to infer that the states contracting the
SOFAs intended that all parties thereto should be bound to take every
step possible to insure that alleged criminals be brought before the court
having either the primary or exclusive right to try the individual under
the terms of the particular agreement. This result would be in line with
the normal practice of interpreting treaties and other international
agreements liberally to accomplish the intended results of the states
party thereto. 53 Laudable as may be the goal of insuring that criminals
be brought to justice, none of the SOFAs to which the United States is
a party contain any statement that indicate the agreements were de-
signed to accomplish that end. Instead the plain terms of most SOFAs
appear to be directed to defining the legal status within the receiving
state of the foreign military force and individuals connected with or a
, See note 14 supra.
" See, e.g., NATO SOFA art. VII, para. 8; Chinese SOFA, art. XIV, para. 8.
" Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 9 (1936).
15 18 U.S.C. § 3185 (1970) authorizes extradition to countries occupied or controlled by the
United States.
"I The word fugitive is used in this paper to describe any individual leaving the territorial
jurisdiction of the alleged offense, whether or not the departure is with specific intent to avoid trial
or punishment by the local authorities.
m See, e.g., Extradition Treaty with Argentina, supra note 22, at Preamble.
' Valentine v. United States ex ret. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 10 (1936).
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part of the force. 54 Many provisions of the SOFAs and the negotiating
histories available indicate that the rights and obligations created ther-
eunder were intended to be limited in geographical scope to the area
within the boundaries of the receiving state.
1. Territorial Indicia in the Language of the SOFAs
Many of the SOFAs and supplementary agreements contain intro-
ductory or preambulatory language similar to that of NATO SOFA
indicating that the states involved desired "to define the status of
[foreign military] forces while in the territory of another Party."5  This
initial limitation gains reinforcement in the definitions of the personnel
whose status is being defined. In most SOFAs, military personnel are
covered by the SOFA only when in the receiving state, often in an
official duty capacity related to defense relationships between the send-
ing and receiving state.'56 Civilian personnel are similarly defined in
several SOFAs 57 and provisions excluding civilian personnel possessing
the nationality of the receiving state are common.'58
The territorial aspects are also found in the portions of the SOFAs
dealing with the exercise of criminal jurisdiction itself. Initially most
SOFAs recognize the right of the sending state's military forces to
exercise criminal powers within the receiving state.'59 Prohibitions
against the exercise of sending state jurisdiction over a civilian national
of the receiving state are found.6 0 The principle of double jeopardy is
contained in all the SOFAs and is ordinarily restricted to the territory
of the receiving state or "the same territory" where the authorities of
one state have exercised jurisdiction pursuant to the SOFA.",
Perhaps the most compelling provision militating against any infer-
"4 See, e.g., NATO SOFA, Preamble; Chinese SOFA, Preamble.
' NATO SOFA, Preamble. See also, e.g., Australian SOFA, Preamble.
'u See, e.g., NATO SOFA, art. l(a); Icelandic SOFA, art. I; Japanese SOFA, art. I(a); Paki-
stani SOFA, para. 1I; But see West Indies SOFA, art. I.
157 See, e.g., NATO SOFA, art. I(b); Korean SOFA, art. 1(b). But see Spanish SOFA, Defini-
tion, para. 2(a)(2).
158 See, e.g., NATO SOFA, art. I(b); Korean SOFA, art. I(b); New Zealand SOFA,
Memorandum of Understandings, para. 11.
' See, e.g., NATO SOFA, art. VII, para. l(a); Nicaraguan SOFA, art. IX, para. 1(a); Austra-
lian SOFA, art. 8, para. 1(a); Philippine SOFA, para. 1(d).
'" See, e.g., Icelandic SOFA, art. 2, para. l(a); Indian Ocean SOFA, Annex II, para. l(d).
' See, e.g., NATO SOFA, art. VII, para. 8; Nicaraguan SOFA, art. IX, para. 6; Korean
SOFA, art. XXII, para. 8. But see Icelandic SOFA, art. 2, para. 8, where the clause prohibits
only Icelandic authorities from trying an individual after the United States authorities have tried
him for the same offense; New Zealand SOFA, Memorandum of Understandings, para. 4(d) which
indicates that "the principle of not trying an accused twice for the same offense (sic) will be
followed." Both of these latter provisions contain no explicit territorial limits.
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ence that a sending state should be required to return any fugitive who
departs the receiving state is the common clause indicating that the
sending and receiving states' authorities shall assist each other in the
arrest of servicemen and civilians "in the territory of the receiving
state." Of the presently effective SOFAs, only the Icelandic and rela-
tively unimportant New Zealand agreement omit this territorial
phrase.'
On the face of the SOFAs themselves, therefore, a strong argument
is available that they do not create any viable obligations outside the
territory of the receiving state. It is reasonable to infer that the drafters
of the SOFA did not intend to create any new obligation to arrest
individuals outside a receiving state. Not only is the requirement to
assist in the arrest limited to the receiving state, but the individual who
would be the subject of the arrest would have left the receiving state and
probably thereby have lost his status as a person defined by the
SOFA.' 3 Considering the relative ease with which the SOFAs could
have included a provision such as the following:
If any accused member of the force or civilian component or dependent
leaves the territory of the receiving State before trial and the imposi-
tion of punishment, if appropriate, in a case where the receiving State
has the primary or exclusive right to exercise jurisdiction, the appropri-
ate authorities of the sending State will return the individual to the
receiving State...
It seems reasonable to conclude that the territorial limitations of the
SOFAs exclude any interpretation that a sending state must return
fugitives who once possessed a status encompassed by the SOFA.
There are two considerations, however, that can point to a contrary
conclusion. The provisions of later SOFAs indicating that the United
States may retain custody beyond the time of charging by the receiving
state may compel an obligation to produce the individual at a later time.
This is discussed more fully in Part C of this Chapter. A second consid-
eration is the other portion of the arrest clause in most SOFAs which
indicates that the sending and receiving states' authorities shall assist
each other in handing over the accused to the authorities entitled to
I NATO SOFA, art. VII, para. 5(a); Icelandic SOFA, art. 2, para. 6(a); New Zealand SOFA,
Memorandum of Understandings, para. 4(c). See also, e.g., Japanese SOFA, art. XVII, para. 5(a)
(in the territory of Japan). See generally Appendix B.
'3 See, e.g., NATO SOFA, art. l(a)-(c); Australian SOFA, art. I. Cf. German Supplementary
Agreement, art. 2, para. 2 (b), where dependents remaining in the Federal Republic after the death
or departure of the serviceman or civilian employee upon whom they depend retain their status
for ninety days. See generally LAZAREFF, supra note 7, at 262-63.
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exercise jurisdiction.' The territorial limitation commonly found in the
arrest clause does not appear to modify this requirement. Moreover it
could be suggested that the receiving state's local authorities could
hardly be expected to assist in any arrest outside of their own territory
since they would not be enforcement agents in the sending state.6 5 Thus
an argument may be advanced that the sending state should hand over
any individual regardless of his location and status. His status as a
member of the force, civilian component, or dependent presumably
would revive when the sending state returns him to the receiving state.'
This construction is somewhat strained and it would seem much more
logical to interpret the word "them" in the phrase "in handing them
over" as referring to those individuals arrested in the receiving state."7
Even this interpretation could, however, extend the obligations of the
sending state beyond the geographical limits by a contention that any-
one once arrested in the receiving state and later assuming a fugitive
status in the sending state should be handed over to the authorities of
the receiving state.6 8 A more limited reading to include only those
continuing constant status as a member of the force's military com-
munity would seem to be more consistent with the general tenor of the
limited geographical scope of the SOFAs. The phrasing, however, is
ambiguous enough to warrant inquiry into the negotiating histories that
are available.6 '
2. NA TO SOFA Negotiations
The negotiating history of the basic NATO SOFA reveals that the
agreement derived from a combination of two documents. Several of the
negotiating parties had reached a prior agreement which may be termed
the Brussels Powers SOFA. 170 Several of the European parties to NATO
'" See, e.g., NATO SOFA, art. VII, para. 5(a); West Indies SOFA, art. IX, para. 5(a).
165 Arguably any assistance rendered by authorities of the receiving state, such as fingerprint or
sketch identification, sent from receiving state to a sending state could constitute assistance in the
arrest. The determination between Iceland and the United States in the Icelandic SOFA, art. 2,
para. 6(a) not to limit cooperation to Icelandic territory could be construed as indicating such
cooperation was envisioned.
" See, e.g., NATO SOFA, art. I(a)-(c).
"61 NATO SOFA, art. VII, para. 5(a). See generally Appendices A and B for the wording of
the arrest and custody provisions of all the SOFAs considered herein.
'" This argument is particularly strong in the case of the individual handed over to the receiving
state for custody. See pp. 41-49 infra.
"' The available negotiating histories are those for NATO SOFA and the German Supplemen-
tary Agreement. Snee, supra note 43; Text of Negotiating History, supra note 20. Metzger and
McMahon, supra note 51, at 634.
'1' Agreement Relative to the Status of Members of the Armed Forces of the Brussels Treaty
Powers, Dec. 21, 1949. The Agreement can be found at Snee, supra note 43, at 331. Belgium,
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom were parties signatory but the
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suggested that this document be used as the basis for negotiations.' The
United States, which was not a party to that agreement, submitted a
draft which paralleled the Brussels Powers SOFA but changed many
definitions and expanded the scope of personnel to include civilians.'
In almost all respects, the Brussels Powers SOFA contained the same
territorial limitations that emerged in the NATO SOFA;7 3 the United
States draft, while indicating a territorial scope in the preamble, con-
tained no such limitation in the provisions dealing with either the arrest
or handing over of individuals accused of offenses in the receiving
state."4 The negotiating history fails to reveal why the final document
contained the limitations in the arrest provisions, but the selection of
the more limited version would support the inference that the drafters
intended to create no obligations for the sending state outside of a
receiving state.'
Extradition was mentioned once during the negotiating discussions by
the Belgian delegate in connection with the formulation of the double
jeopardy provision of Article VII.' As first proposed, that provision
would have contained no limits and a trial by one party would have
precluded a second trial for the same offense by the other party in-
volved. "7 The Belgian delegate objected that such a rule would result in
individuals being able to escape punishment altogether. He visualized a
agreement never went into effect because of the emergence of NATO. LAZAREFF, supra note 20,
at 45.
I Snee, supra note 43, at 55.
172 Id. The original draft proposed by the United States is at id. at 345.
I" In the Brussels Powers SOFA, the "members of a foreign force" were defined as those
"travelling or resident in the execution of their duties under the Brussels Treaty in the territory of
a Contracting Party other than the 'sending State'." Id. at 331. In the arrest provision it was
provided: "Where the authorities of the 'receiving State' consider that, in respect of an offence
committed in the 'receiving State' by a 'member of a foreign force', the necessities of the investiga-
tion, trial and execution of the sentence require the imprisonment of the offender, the authorities
of the 'foreign force' will assist in making the arrest, if the offender can be found and arrested in
the territory of the 'receiving State'." Id. at 334.
174"... [D]esiring to establish mutual privileges and immunities for personnel, who are subject
to military law, of one member nation on duty in the territory of another member nation." Id. at
345; "The authorities of the receiving and sending States will assist each other in the arrest and
handing over of offenders. Id. at 349.
'n Metzger and McMahon, supra note 51, at 633. The definitions of personnel to be encom-
passed by the SOFA proposed by the United States were also broader in territory than that in the
Brussels Powers SOFA as indicated in note 173 supra: ". . . military personnel of the sending
State, and civilian personnel subject to military law of the sending State maintained by a Contract-
ing Party on duty in the territory of another Contracting Party. ... Snee, supra note 43, at
345-46. This definition may easily be read to include personnel not physically in the receiving state
but merely assigned to a position therein.
"' Snee, supra note 43, at 104.
177 Id.
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Belgian delinquent escaping France after a French trial pursuant to the
SOFA. Such a person, he indicated, would avoid punishment because
of Belgium's constitutional prohibition against the extradition of its
nationals.'78 None of the delegates suggested that they intended to re-
quire Belgium to violate her Constitution; instead the double jeopardy
provision was modified to include only the territory where the trial
occurred, leaving Belgium free to prosecute its fugitive citizen in her
own courts. 7 '
The territorial language of the NATO SOFA is arguably strength-
ened by the bilateral arrangement made between the United States and
Iceland for the status of American forces and property in that nation
which has no armed forces. 80 Iceland was a full participant in the nego-
tiations and signed but never ratified the NATO SOFA. The executive
agreement reached with Iceland became effective before the end of the
negotiations and was revealed to all negotiators. 8' This agreement con-
stitutes the second American SOFA in the sense that it delineated prior-
ities in the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction offenses.'82 The SOFA
provisions are contained in an annex to an earlier agreement concerning
defense arrangements in furtherance of NATO by the United States in
Iceland. Neither the basic agreement nor the annex contains a preamble
indicating that the provisions are to be limited in geographical terms.,"
Most significantly the arrest and handing over provisions do not contain
the territorial phrase found within the comparable NATO SOFA provi-
sions. 184 The definition of the personnel covered by this Icelandic SOFA,
however, is couched in language requiring the person to be "in the
territory of Iceland" for the SOFA to be applicable.'85 The Icelandic
178 Id.
17 Id. at 105. In a subsequent discussion of the double jeopardy provision after it had been
modified, the Netherlands delegate commented "that one case not provided for in this paragraph
was when, for instance, an American soldier injured a Belgian in transit through his country on
his way, say to Holland. If the American force held a court-martial in Holland, the soldier,
although he could not be tried by the Netherlands authorities, could be tried by the Belgians, if
they got hold of him." The other delegates recognized the problem but indicated that they hoped
it would rarely occur since trial would normally occur where the offense was committed and the
witnesses were located. Id. at 112. This discussion would seem to indicate that none of the delegates
felt that United States authorities would have been obliged to return the errant soldier to Belgium
either to try him there or to surrender him to local authorities. See pp. 35-36 infra.
's Snee, supra note 43, at 57.
I' Id. at 210.
13 The first was the Philippines Bases Agreement. See note 51 supra.
'1 Defense Agreement with Iceland, May 5, 1951, [1951] 2 U.S.T. 1195, T.I.A.S. No. 2266;
Icelandic SOFA.
' Icelandic SOFA, art. 2, para. 6(a).
" Id. at art. I.
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representative, while signing the NATO SOFA indicated that any other
NATO country stationing forces in Iceland could have extended to it
the same terms as the United States had in its agreement and that
Iceland considered this sufficient since it could never be a sending
state. '8 Whether Iceland felt that the bilateral SOFA with America was
more protective of its interests is at best speculative, but it seems indis-
putable that the agreement could be more easily interpreted than NATO
SOFA to require the returning to Iceland fugitive servicemen or civil-
ians who allegedly commit offenses in Iceland while in a status covered
by that SOFA."7
The examination of the negotiating history of NATO SOFA and the
text itself, as well as the contemporaneous Icelandic SOFA, fail to
reveal that the framers contemplated any requirement that sending
states would be obligated to bring any of its personnel into the receiving
state in order to permit the authorities of that state to exercise their right
of jurisdiction.
Since such action would closely resemble extradition, no matter how
labelled, it is useful to consider the likely reaction of the negotiating
states had a specific proposal been suggested to require return of fugi-
tives. It has been suggested that many of the negotiators would have
disputed any indication that the inclusion of the limiting territorial lan-
guage meant that the United States or any sending state had no duty
to arrest and hand over its servicemen who were no longer in the receiv-
ing state. 88 This argument seems somewhat tenuous in view of the
Belgian delegate's comments discussed above and the failure of the
other negotiators to object to his comments about the Belgian rule
barring extradition of nationals.'89 Of the twelve parties in the negotia-
tions, eight had at the time extradition treaties with the United States
that completely exempted extradition of nationals.8 0 A ninth party,
Italy, had an extradition treaty with the United States that completely
omitted mention of the nationality of the fugitive. Italy had for a long
time interpreted this treaty to permit it to refuse to extradite its nation-
als based upon its internal law disfavoring such extradition even while
the United States interpreted the treaty to compel delivery of United
lU LAZAREFF, supra note 20, at 422-23.
'7 This author is of the opinion that the Icelandic SOFA does compel the United States to
deliver fugitives who committed a crime while possessing a status covered by the Icelandic SOFA.
There do not appear to be any cases involving such a fugitive.
' Metzger and McMahon, supra note 51, at 634.
"' See p. 32 supra.
'" These countries were Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway and Portugal. See notes 21, 144 supra.
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States citizens."' Since it can be assumed that most of the members of
a sending state's military forces and civilian components will be nation-
als of the sending state, 92 it would seem more logical to infer that the
majority of the delegates would have opposed any obligation that would
have effectively altered its normal extradition relationships. It would
appear that the delegates' general silence about the problem of fugitives,
together with the desire expressed in the Preamble, means that NATO
SOFA is not designed to cope with the fugitive situation.
This conclusion that NATO SOFA does not require sending states
to return personnel to the receiving state to aid in its exercise of jurisdic-
tion is not inconsistent with the tenor expressed throughout Article VII,
where cooperation and consideration of the other state's wishes are
emphasized.' If one accepts the proposition that the primary reason
for setting up the priorities in the exercise of jurisdiction was to resolve
conflicting claims over the right to try an individual for the same act or
omission when both authorities could claim legitimate power over the
individual concerned, the problem disappears when the individual leaves
the territory where the simultaneous claims exist. At that time, either
party should be able to employ any legitimate means to restore the
individual to its power and exercise its jurisdiction. If the individual flees
to a third state, extradition may be attempted by either state.", Depor-
tation is a possibility if the fugitive is not a national or citizen of the
third state."5 If the individual returns to the sending state, then that
state is free to extradite the individual or to exercise jurisdiction over
the offense involved; if the offense is not subject to prosecution in the
sending state' prosecution for the flight involved may be a possibility."7
The problems of the fugitive criminal are difficult, but an assertion that
"I Chariton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913). The Italian government agreed in 1946 to extradite
its own nationals to the United States. 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 34, at 866, 872-73.
1,2 See Text of Negotiating History, supra note 20, at 304.
II NATO SOFA, art. VII, paras. 3(c), 5(a) and (b), 6, and 10(b).
"' See the first Extradition Treaty with Argentina cited in note 22 supra, at art. 3. This provision
permits extradition of an offender for a crime committed outside the requesting state's territorial
jurisdiction if the state requested to permit the extradition would have jurisdiction in similar
circumstances. However, older treaties tend to limit extradition to offenses committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the requesting state and have been interpreted by the State Department
as so limited when the language is not specific. 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 34, at 890-97.
,, See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 (a)(9), 1251 (a)(1) (1970).
IU See notes 15, 16 supra.
117 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1970). This section makes it criminal to move in interstate or
foreign commerce to avoid prosecution "under the law of the place from which [the alleged
criminal] flees." This would logically include a fugitive from abroad but the venue provision in
the same section limits prosecution to the Federal Judicial District where the original crime was
committed.
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NATO SOFA is a partial remedy for the situation does not seem to be
borne out either by the language or the negotiating history.
3. Negotiation of German Supplementary Agreement
In the fourth year following the signatory date of NATO SOFA,
negotiations began on the multilateral Supplementary Agreement for
West Germany." 8 The document that emerged in 1959 and went into
effect in 1963 is more than four times the length of the basic NATO
SOFA.'99 The very first article indicates that the rights and obligations
of the forces of the sending states are to be modified as provided in the
agreement "in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany."2' w
This initial territorial indication is reinforced throughout the agreement
and in the negotiating history.20' In discussing a provision relating to the
right of a German representative to have access to an accused individual
being held in custody by the authorities of a sending state, a request by
the Danish representative that a provision be inserted to indicate that
the right would exist only in Germany was rejected by all the other
delegations as superfluous since it "would only confirm the general
principles relating to the territorial scope of the supplementary arrange-
ments ."202
One provision in the Supplementary Agreement does create an obli-
gation transcending German boundaries. Whenever a sending state ex-
ercises jurisdiction over an offense committed against German interests
by a person covered by the NATO SOFA and Supplementary Agree-
ment, the arraignment and trial are to occur in Germany unless the
applicable law requires the trial to be held elsewhere, in cases of military
exigency2"" or in the interests of justice.20' Thus a sending state would
in a normal case have to return any individual to West Germany in
order to prosecute him. Quite realistically the intent of this article is
susceptible to negation by a policy of determining that the interests of
Text of Negotiating History, supra note 20, at 2.
' German Supplementary Agreement. In The Status of NATO Forces in the Federal Republic
of Germany, a pamphlet produced by United States Army Europe in 1963, the English text of
NATO SOFA occupies 16 pages; the Supplementary Agreement, together with its Protocol of
Signature occupies 68.
2" German Supplementary Agreement, art. i.
21 See. e.g., id. at art. 5.
202 Text of Negotiating History, supra note 20, at 443.
m German Supplementary Agreement, art. 26, para. l(b). During the negotiations, the sending
states declared that the exception for military necessity was designed to cover cases where troops
entered Germany temporarily for maneuvers. Text of Negotiating History, supra note 20, at 459;
German Supplementary Agreement, Protocol of Signature, Re art. 26, para. l(b).
I" German Supplementary Agreement, art. 26, para. I.
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justice dictate trying individuals outside the Federal Republic, even
though German authorities are to be notified in every such case and be
given an opportunity to express their views on the proposed situs of
trial.205 It would appear, however, that good faith compliance with the
article would compel some obligation on the sending state outside Ger-
many's borders and would extend the territorial scope of the agreement
despite the negotiators' statements to the contrary.
More significant than the inclusion of this article covering cases to
be tried by sending state authorities is the lack of any comparable
provision dealing with cases to be tried by German authorities. The
negotiation history published nowhere discusses the problem of the fugi-
tive.200 One unpublished commentator, who claimed to have attended
"numerous sessions of the negotiating committees '2 1 during the draft-
ing of the agreement, points out that there are no provisions in any of
the SOFAs specifically providing for the return of personnel. 20 He indi-
cates that SOFAs are not designed to have any application outside of
the receiving state209 and that in the case of a fugitive "the only remedy
available to foreign authorities is a formal extradition proceedings (sic)
if such a treaty or statute exists. 2 10 While the commentator was refer-
ring to the SOFAs in effect in 1960 when he wrote, his close connection
with the negotiations indicate that the drafters of the German Supple-
mentary Agreement did not attempt to deal with the fugitive from
German court proceedings .21
Extradition did receive considerable attention in the negotiations al-
though in a context separate from the fugitive from West Germany.212
The discussions finally resulted in the following protocol to the agree-
ment concerning Article VII of the NATO SOFA:
[T]he Federal Republic does not consider it to be within its competence
to decide on requests for extradition of members of a force, of a
civilian component or dependents.
(b) The sending States will not act upon requests for extradition of
l' Id. at para. 1(b). The same article permits a German representative to attend any trial by
the sending state outside the Federal Republic unless his presence is incompatible with the court's
rules or the security of the sending state. Id. at para. 2.
Text of Negotiating History, supra note 20.
2 H. Watson, Criminal Jurisdiction in Germany Under the New Supplementary Agreement;
A Step Forward?, Foreword, May 1960 (Unpublished Thesis in The Judge Advocate General's
School, U.S. Army Library).
'I Id. at 74.
I d. at 75.
210 Id.
"I Id. at Foreword.
212 Text of Negotiating History, supra note 20, at 1098-1138.
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Germans who are present in the Federal territory as members of a
force or as dependents.2t 3
This provision resulted from the expressed concern of a Belgian delegate
about Belgian personnel in Germany. He did not want German authori-
ties to apprehend Belgians and extradite them to a third country because
they were present in Germany as a result of orders or accompanying the
Belgian force."' Several other delegations expressed similar concern
about their personnel who might be involuntarily present in the Federal
Republic.2"5 The American representative indicated that apparently no
case involving the problem had arisen under any SOFA but that the
large American contingent in Germany warranted specific attention and
provisions." The West German delegate, although concerned about
giving up a right that other NATO states might have to extradite send-
ing state personnel, " was anxious to avoid the circumvention of the
German Constitution by a sending state in delivering a German member
of a sending state's force or dependent to another state."' The agree-
ment emerging from the discussions seems to accommodate all the
parties' concerned, although difficulties might be raised when a German
member of a sending state's force is reassigned to another location
where extradition proceedings might be applicable." 9
In view of the failure of the negotiators to deal specifically with the
case of a fugitive from German justice, the tenor of the discussions
about extradition, and the constitutional bar to the extradition of Ger-
man nationals,2 0 it seems logical to conclude that the Supplementary
Agreement was not intended to create any new obligation to deliver
fugitives to the German court processes, at least as long as the individual
was not first subjected to custody in the hands of the receiving state, a
problem discussed in Part C, below. To conclude that the German
negotiators wanted to impose on the sending states an obligation tanta-
mount to mandatory extradition of its nationals when the German Con-
stitution would preclude application of the same sort of obligation to
21 German Supplementary Agreement, Protocol of Signature, Re art. VII, para. 2.
211 Text of Negotiating History, supra note 20, at 557, 1087.
2 Id. at 1118.
2 Id. at 1117-18.
21 Id. at 1118, 1138.
2Id. at 1099-1100. The concern would naturally be only about servicemen or dependents since
by definition civilian employees encompassed by the SOFA and supplementary agreement could
not be Germans. NATO SOFA, art. I(b).
"I But see German Supplementary Agreement, Protocol of Signature, Re art. I, para. 3, which
provides that the sending states will refrain from sending to West Germany as members of their
forces persons who are solely Germans.
2, GRUNDGESETZ, art. 16(2) (1949) (W. Ger.).
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Germany, without a clear indication in either the terms of the agreement
or the negotiations, is unreasonable. Although West Germany had
started to regain acceptability, the Governments of Belgium, France,
and the Netherlands, all accepting generally the principle that nationals
are immune from extradition, would most likely have rejected any pro-
posal that required extradition of their nationals to their former
enemy."'
4. Other Considerations
Based on the foregoing discussion, it appears very difficult to inter-
pret the SOFAs in general as compelling the sending state to aid the
receiving state involved by returning personnel to that state to permit
the effective exercise of its primary right of jurisdiction. As each SOFA
is examined individually, the territorial considerations may be stronger
or weaker than those contained in the NATO SOFA. The almost total
lack of such provisions in the Icelandic SOFA may support an inference
that return of an individual is mandatory.222 The failure of any of the
agreements subsequent to NATO SOFA to contain any substantial
revision of the terms of arrest and handing over obligations seem to
militate against interpreting any such agreement as creating an obliga-
tion that does not exist in NATO SOFA.22 3
One early writer in commenting upon the Girard case 422  and the
waiver of jurisdiction by the United States indicated that the power of
a sending state to waive its jurisdiction must inherently contain the
power to deliver the individual to the sending state.22 He posited that
the requirement to give a request for waiver sympathetic consideration
does not depend upon the location of the accused .22 This assumption is
questionable if the waiver, as provided in the SOFA, is applicable only
2 See p. 3 supra. See also Jeschek, Int'l Criminal Law: Its Object and Recent Developments,
M. BASSOUNI AND V. NANAA, I INT'L CRIMINAL LAW 49, 58 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Jeschek].
2 See pp. 32-33 supra.
m See I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 954 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955). The lack of most
of the territorial indications in the Libyan and Pakistani SOFAs supports an inference that return
of any fugitive under those agreements was intended. By using the rationale employed in Valentine
v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 229 U.S. 5 (1936), one could conclude that the inclusion of
limiting territorial terms in SOFAs negotiated after these two (1954 and 1959) should be construed
as indicating that both rights and obligations of the United States are restricted. Similarly, NATO
SOFA's limited terms in comparison not only with the Icelandic SOFA, but also the Philippine
Bases Agreement, would indicate that obligations should be restricted to the territory of the
receiving state. See pp. 46-47 infra.
22 Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
2 Baldwin, supra note 117, at 87.
2 Id. at 88.
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to an individual having a defined status. The status is arguably lost in
departure from the receiving state. The writer somewhat weakened the
tenor of his proposition in suggesting that it applied only to personnel
subject to the authority of the sending state's military officials. 27 He
also indicated that the exercise of such a power or obligation should be
contingent upon the receiving state's officials corresponding duty to act
promptly, and to restrain from insisting upon treating minor offenses
as compelling a return to the receiving state. 28
As partial support for his proposition, Professor Baldwin indicated
that requiring the sending state to rely on extradition treaties would not
seem consonant with the intention of the SOFAs. "It would usually
mean that crime would go unpunished. 29 Unfortunately the "inten-
tion" of the SOFAs is a vague term that is susceptible of many interpre-
tations. The expressed intention is ordinarily to define status within the
receiving state.230 Suppression of crime is secondary, if contained at all.
It would not appear to be inconsistent with a SOFA to use an extradi-
tion treaty to enable the receiving state to regain effective control over
any individual once covered by a SOFA. Extradition is the ordinary
method to perfect the jurisdictional defect existing when a person is not
present.21 Resort to extradition by the receiving state would likely be
the only way to insure punishment if the accused individual fled to a
state where neither the sending nor the receiving state has any authority
to exercise jurisdictional power. 23 Thus, the complaint that crime
would go unpunished reflects the reluctance of states to execute com-
plete extradition arrangements. Apparently, the SOFAs are not de-
signed to correct this deficiency. If the accused returns to the sending
state, that state would have the right to proceed criminally against the
individual under international law and, from a moral viewpoint, prob-
ably should do So.233
A more recent article has presented the theory that, notwithstanding
the geographical tenors of the SOFAs, an implicit obligation to deliver
a serviceman to the receiving state should be recognized in cases where
an accused managed to leave the receiving state before his participation
in an offense is discovered, or before he has been arrested and placed
2" Id. at 89-91.
rn Id. at 90-91.
2" Id. at 89.
2" See, e.g., NATO SOFA, Preamble.
231 Jeschek, supra note 221, at 56. See pp. 7-8 supra.
z See note 194 supra.
m See pp. 2-3 supra.
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in custody. 3' Failure to recognize such an obligation where public
interest in or outrage over the offense has been aroused would create
"obvious repercussions" ' 5 and draw the viability of the SOFA arrange-
ments into question. Apparently, the authors foresee the probable reper-
cussions to be a reluctance to save any jurisdiction on the part of the
receiving state, constant interference with military custody decisions by
local officials, and the possibility of a renunciation of the SOFAs.2 3
It seems ironic that the same sort of situation that creates the right
of a defendant in a state criminal proceeding in the United States to
obtain a change of venue to avoid an atmosphere of mob justice or trial
by press" 7 should be advanced as a reason to turn an American service-
man over to foreign courts that may be unfair because of those very
circumstances. It is unquestionable that the American military com-
munity may benefit from such action; such willing cooperation will
encourage better relations between the local civilian criminal authorities
and American commanders and their subordinates. The difficulty with
these considerations is that they are more political and diplomatic than
legal. Such considerations call for making the obligations explicit rather
than forming a rationale to buttress an otherwise questionable duty.
Political issues and diplomatic considerations go into the formulation
of extradition treaties. The handling of such cases by extradition ordi-
narily permits impartial judicial participation and review in the process
to insure that there is a legal basis for the intended prosecution 3 8 or
that the offense involved is not so political in nature that asylum rather
than delivery for the offender should ensue.23 9 Extradition practice and
treaties have evolved a rule that the state obtaining extradition can not
generally prosecute or retain the offender for an offense other than the
one supporting the extradition request nor can the state re-extradite the
offender to a third state without permission from the state granting
extradition.4 0 The SOFAs do not appear to have such rules built into
their operation. 4' Indeed, offenses of a political nature are specifically
mentioned in the areas of both exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction.242
Individuals of the sending state's military community are required to
2m Metzger and McMahon, supra note 51, at 635.
= Id.
2 Id.
Shephard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1970).
21 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 34, at 799-858.
240 Id. at 1095-1107.
2 See, e.g., NATO SOFA, art. VII.
242 Id. at paras. 2(c), 3(a)(i).
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refrain from political activities in the receiving state by a common
provision in the SOFAs.21 3 All these matters are subject to careful
consideration by the courts and the Secretary of State in extradition
cases. 44 It would seem preferable to accord individuals who are in a
foreign country, sometimes involuntarily as a result of orders or a natu-
ral desire to accompany the family breadwinner, the same considera-
tions if they somehow manage to escape the grasp of a state more
involved in its own politics than in doing justice. Certainly the true
criminal should be surrendered, and the American extradition process
is designed to reach that very end. A SOFA requirement to deliver
automatically any alleged offender or convict subjects the individual
involved to unequal treatment. 45
For the reasons discussed, it would seem to follow that the SOFAs
are not susceptible to a construction automatically engendering an obli-
gation to deliver fugitives. There are, however, in most United States
SOFAs and Supplementary Agreements following the NATO SOFA
detailed custody provisions that arguably require delivery of offenders,
if not at all times, at specific times to permit the receiving state to
exercise its jurisdiction effectively. These will now be considered in more
detail.
C. The Right of Custody as an Obligation to Return
1. General Considerations
In contrast to the relatively short period envisioned for the sending
state's right to retain custody under limited circumstances in the basic
NATO SOFA,'" many later agreements expand in scope and time the
right of the United States to obtain and retain custody of personnel
forming part of its overseas military community.247 In exercising this
right to custody, American authorities are ordinarily required to con-
sider the wishes of local authorities in determining the form custody
should take. 4' Under nearly all the expanded provisions, the United
3 See, e.g., NATO SOFA, art. II; Icelandic SOFA, art. 2, para. 1(b).
24 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184, 3186 (1970). See 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 34, at 1026-30.
" U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4. This clause is applicable by its terms only to action by
states subordinate to the United States Government and does not apply to federal action. Simpson
v. United States, 342 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1965). But see Ballard v. Laird, 350 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.
Cal. 1972); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 234-35 (1944) (J. Murphy dissenting). In
the last case Justice Murphy suggested that equal protection was included in the due process of
the Fifth Amendment.
U NATO SOFA, art. VII, para. 5(c).
27 See pp. 13-17 supra.
"' See, e.g., German Supplementary Agreement, art. 22, para. 3.
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States is to make the accused member of the force or civilian component
or dependent in its custody available for trial or investigative proceed-
ings. 49 Two of the SOFAs and the German Supplementary Agreement
require United States authorities to "take all reasonable steps to that
end" (i.e., making the individual available for trial) and "to prevent any
prejudice to the course of justice. '2 50 Protocols are common requiring
the United States to hold the individual in the vicinity of the local
sending state's authorities which are exercising jurisdiction if the mili-
tary force is actually present in that area. 25'
On their face these provisions would seemingly compel the United
States to produce any individual over whom the American military
authorities have taken custody pursuant to the relevant agreement.
There are, however, two ambiguities in the terms of most such provi-
sions. The phrasing ordinarily is such that the United States is obliged
to produce an individual possessing the status defined by the SOFA. 52
The individual who manages to evade the custody of American military
authorities and depart from the sending state's territory would appar-
ently lose that status in the process. Since most SOFAs require the
military member to be in the territory of the receiving state to be eligible
for the benefits or rights accorded under the SOFA, 2 3 it may be posited
that the sending state has no obligation to produce an individual who
" See, e.g., id.; Korean SOFA, art. XXII, para. 5(c). See also Text of Negotiating History,
supra note 20, at 1087, where the French delegate, in proposing the article which eventually
emerged as the one granting the sending states the right to custody of most accused personnel,
indicated that the forces had sufficient administrative and disciplinary power to insure that an
accused member of the force or civilian component or a dependent would appear before his judges
for investigation, trial or after his sentence had become final.
'" Chinese SOFA, Agreed Minutes to Article XIV, Re para. 5(c), para. 3; Korean SOFA, art.
XXII, para. 5(c); German Supplementary Agreement, art. 22, para. 3. The phrase involved first
appeared in the German Supplementary Agreement and is accompanied in both the English and
French text by the German word Verdunkelungsgefahr. See text at note 85 supra. Thus in the
supplementary agreement, the German interpretation would be helpful and presumably control.
An old German dictionary translates the word as "prejudice to the course of justice," as does the
English text. CASSEL'S NEW GERMAN DICTIONARY 654 (1939). Gefahr is a common German noun
meaning danger or fraud, id. at 226; Verdunkelung is a common noun meaning black-out or
darkening, id. at 654, but has a legal connotation of collusion. ADLER, ELSEVIER'S DICTIONARY
OF CRIMINAL SCIENCE 198-99 (1960). THE TEXT OF THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 20,
fails to aid in the interpretation. It is thus unclear whether this phrase should be interpreted to
demand that the United States should do everything possible in any location to insure an accused's
presence at trial or investigation if such accused has come into American custody, or merely to
refrain from any action that would aid or abet an accused in avoiding German justice.
11 German Supplementary Agreement, Protocol of Signature, Re art. 22; Chinese SOFA,
Agreed Official Minutes to Article XIV, Re para. 5(c), para. 4.
" See, e.g., Korean SOFA, art. XXII, art. 5(c); Philippine SOFA, Agreed Official Minutes,
para. 5. But see Japanese SOFA, Agreed Minutes, Article XVII, Re para. 5, para. 1.
' See, e.g., Chinese SOFA, art. I, para. l(a).
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has lost his status. A contrary argument that such status may be termi-
nated only when done in accordance with ordinary military procedures
is possible, but is weakened in the case of SOFAs where that status can
be acquired without any official military sanction.5 4
A second difficulty with the custodial provisions is their phrasing to
require the production of an individual only for investigation or trial.
The mention of these two specific events could be construed to exclude
a perhaps more important occasion, the time when the right to custody
by the United States has expired and the receiving state desires the
accused individual himself to impose the adjudged punishment. In re-
buttal to such a contention it may be argued that such a construction
would clearly violate the obvious intent of the framers to accompany
the right of custody with the obligation to produce. 55 The individual
who manages to get in such a situation, however, beside relying on the
principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius,2 56 may argue that his
presence is not really required since the outstanding judgment of the
receiving state court will survive for some period and that that state may
proceed in any other legitimate manner to obtain his custody if he
should happen into a location that the sending state may extend its
power to by such methods as extradition.
Nevertheless, the acquisition of custody by the sending state does
present a viable basis for implying an obligation to return an individual
who intentionally or passively slips out of that custody when exercised
in the receiving state.27 The authors of the article which concluded that
an implicit obligation to return even those servicemen over whom no
such custody has been effected, find a stronger basis for implying the
obligation when custody has been perfected.2 8 Under such circumstan-
ces, the failure of the United States to return the fugitive is considered
a clear breach of its custodial responsibility.29 As has already been
indicated, the United States can hardly be a guarantor of an accused's
presence if he should manage to reach a third state in which neither the
receiving nor sending state could assert a right to obtain his custody. 260
The obligation of the United States in such a situation must be limited
to locations where the United States has a legitimate right to assert its
power over the individual.
2" See, e.g., id.; Greek Supplementary Agreement, art. I, para. 2.
2" Metzger and McMahon, supra note 51 at 636-37.
2" 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 954 (8th ed. 1955).
21 Metzger and McMahon, supra note 51, at 636-38.
m Id. at 638.
251 Id.
2 See p. 39 supra.
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It must be realized that the speedy return of an individual who was
in American custody will mollify the immediate problems of the mili-
tary authorities at the scene of the alleged offense. Failure to return
promptly an accused to local justice, where local authorities feel that
the United States is obligated to do so,2" ' will decrease the likelihood of
a friendly relationship with such officials and even national authorities.
The waiver of primary rights to exercise jurisdiction by the receiving
state will probably decline and controversy about cases involving the
official duty status may increase. Local authorities may increase their
surveillance of the type of custody actually exercised by American au-
thorities and requests for the waiver of primary American jurisdiction
may rise. Local anger about the incident, especially if it involves moral
overtones, may increase prejudice against Americans not only in the
court system but in ordinary intercourse with the local community. Thus
failure to return the individual who gets away will have an adverse
impact on community relations and the American servicemen and civil-
ians who remain in the area. Whether such considerations warrant
prompt action, the possibility of such seems somewhat diminished by
the recent cases involving attempts to prevent return of servicemen, two
of which lasted more than a year before the Supreme Court denied
certiorari . 2
2. Two Special Cases: Spain and the Philippines
The custodial provisions of the Spanish SOFA, the most recently
concluded executive agreement, 23 contain the strongest language sup-
porting a United States obligation to return a fugitive. Not only are the
definitions in that SOFA contingent upon the official assignment of the
individual serviceman or employee to Spain rather than his presence
therein, 264 but also the "United States military authorities shall
guarantee [the accused's] immediate appearance . . . in any proceed-
ings that may require his presence and, in any case, his appearance at
the trial." Regardless of difficulties inherent in the possible escape of
an individual in American custody to a third state,215 a valid interna-
262 Metzger and McMahon, supra note 51, at 638.
2 Williams v. Rogers, 449 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 926 (1972); Holmes
v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972). Sergeant Williams
commenced his action in April 1970; the petition for a writ of certiorari was denied in February
1972. Privates Holmes and Tucker in the latter case began their suit in July 1971; certiorari was
denied in September 1972 but a related habeas corpus action remained pending until late January
1973. See note 352 infra.
243 The Spanish SOFA was signed September 25, 1970.
2164 Spanish SOFA, Definitions, para. 2.
10 See note 194 and p. 39 supra.
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tional obligation would seemingly exist when the individual is subject
to military authority."'
Two factors external to the Spanish SOFA support the apparently
broader geographical scope of that agreement in comparison to other
SOFAs. The United States and Spain concluded a new extradition
treaty about four months prior to the implementation of the Spanish
SOFA."7 This treaty, which was approved by the Senate, contained the
provision common to most recent extradition treaties of the United
States permitting the Executive Authority of the United States to extra-
dite American nationals. 28 Although the treaty was not ratified until
after the effective date of the SOFA, the cooperative spirit between the
two countries in expressed intentions concerning the suppression of
crime would pervade their diplomatic relationship. 29
The Spanish SOFA replaced a working agreement denominated Pro-
cedural Agreement Number 16, which was signed by representatives of
and for the Spanish High Command and the Department of Defense. 70
The increased stature of the new agreement was accompanied by the
stronger language indicating the guarantee.Y Even under the old ar-
rangement, the Federal Courts of the United States in two unreported
cases declined to interfere with the return of American servicemen to
Spain, in one case from New Jersey where discharge of the airman
involved was almost completed, 22 and in the other where the Army
returned a soldier from the Federal Republic of Germany.273 The for-
266 The Spanish SOFA, art. XVIII, para. 3, permits the United States to acquire custody of any
person "who is legally subject to the detention of the military authorities of the United States."
26I Extradition Treaty with Spain, supra note 22, which was signed May 19, 1970. The Spanish
SOFA was signed September 25, 1970.
268 See note 22 supra.
268 Extradition Treaty with Spain, supra note 22, at Preamble.
Procedural Agreement No. 16 to the 26 September 1953 Agreements, Sept. 4, 1955. Under
this agreement, a mixed Commission on Jurisdiction was established. Generally the United States
had the right to exercise jurisdiction over all offenses subject to punishment through the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. An elaborate procedure was provided for the waiver of American jurisdic-
tion upon request of local authorities. The Agreement gave the United States the right to custody
and provided that "United States authorities shall accept the responsibility of assuring the presence
of the offender at the appointed time of trial."
"I Spanish SOFA, art. XVIII, para. 3.
272 Buskers v. Seamans, Civil No. 1208-70 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 1970), stay denied, No. 19,270 (3d
Cir. Sept. 18, 1970), stay denied, Memorandum Order (U.S. Sept. 19, 1970) (Blackmun, Cir. J).
This case is described in Metzger and McMahon, supra note 51, at 620.
23 Server v. Laird, Civil No. 1583-71 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 1971), stay denied, No. --- (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 29, 1971), stay denied, Memorandum Order (U.S. Nov. 30, 1971) (Burger C.J. and Black-
mun, Cir. J). Server escaped from American custody in January, 1970 at Rota, Spain just prior
to being released to Spanish authorities for service of sentence following a conviction for possession
of drugs. After a sojourn in Switzerland, he surrendered to military authorities in the United States
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mer case was accomplished prior to the signing of the SOFA, but the
latter occurred thereafter."'
Under these circumstances, it appears that the obligation to return
an individual to Spain should be recognized as valid in international law,
even if further arguments are possible under American domestic lawY5
Like the Spanish SOFA, the newest one,"' the Philippine agreement,
the oldest one,27 contains some unique custody provisions. Under the
main provisions of the 1947 Philippine Bases Agreements and the
Agreed Official Minutes of the present SOFA, Philippine authorities
are to entrust "without delay to the commanding officer of the nearest
base" the custody of any serviceman, civilian employee or dependent
over whom the Philippine courts will exercise jurisdiction.7 This officer
is to provide a certificate that the accused "will be produced before [the
competent] court when required by it. 279 Because of the categorization
of personnel, the same defect in the loss of status may exist if the
accused manages to leave the Philippines. 280 The lack of a specific re-
quirement to surrender for the service of a sentence, as described above,
may be a problem in this SOFA also.23' The duty under the SOFA to
provide a receipt containing a promise to make the individual available,
however, arguably would create a stronger commitment on the part of
the United States. Although the certificate is to be produced by an
individual,282 his position as the commanding officer doing an act re-
and was taken to Germany for a court-martial involving military offenses. In July 1971, the
Secretary of the Army ordered his return to Spain, which generated the cited action.
2 The Spanish SOFA was signed September 25, 1970.
" See p. 66 infra.
'e See note 51 supra.
27? The Philippines Bases Agreement is the oldest SOFA as that term is used herein. The present
Philippine SOFA, concluded in 1965, was an amendment of the criminal jurisdiction provisions
only to conform more closely to the NATO SOFA scheme.
"8 Philippine Bases Agreement, art. XIII, para. 5; Philippine SOFA, Agreed Official Minutes,
para. 5.
27 Id.
The Philippine Bases Agreement did not contain any clear definition of the personnel in-
volved. The Philippine SOFA, Agreed Official Minutes, para. I, indicates that primary United
States jurisdiction will extend only to those persons subject to the military law of the United States
regularly assigned to the Philippines or present in the Philippines in connection with the presence
there of the United States bases. The main provisions of the SOFA adopt NATO SOFA terminol-
ogy (e.g., members of the United States armed forces or civilian component) without defining the
personnel to be covered. It could be asserted that such terminology inherently carries the limited
territorial scope of NATO SOFA. The use of the word "stationed", although limited to the
question of priority of jurisdiction, could indicate the reverse, i.e., that no territorial limitations
were envisioned.
n Philippine SOFA, Agreed Official Minutes, para. 5. See p. 43 supra.
282 Philippine SOFA, Agreed Official Minutes, para. 5.
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quired by the agreement seems to be an act of the United States." 3
There is a factor external to the Bases Agreement that might warrant
a stronger inference of an American obligation to return a fugitive who
returns to the United States after his custody has been entrusted to a
base commander. When the Base Agreement was signed, the Philippines
had been independent for less than a year. Prior to that time, the Philip-
pines had been a territory and for all practical purposes a forty-ninth
state of the United States for extradition.2 8 Alleged or convicted crimi-
nals in either the United States or the Philippines were subject to han-
dling under interstate extradition, a process considerably simpler than
international extradition.2 5 Although no extradition treaty with the
Philippines was effected after its independence, the drafters of such a
treaty may not have contemplated the same difficulties with extradition
that were raised in the NATO SOFA negotiations.8 6 The negotiators
could have assumed that a fugitive would be included in the terminol-
ogy. Even if the problem had not been discussed, it would be reasonable
to argue that the negotiators would have intended to include them within
the terms of the agreement. While this method of interpreting interna-
tional agreements is somewhat tenuous,8 7 it seems more rational than
attempting to infer the same agreement among several nations whose
extradition relationships would be considerably modified.
Accordingly, among the SOFAs to which the United States is cur-
rently a party, a strong case may be presented that individuals whose
custody is given to American military authorities must be returned from
the United States to either the Philippines or Spain.2 8
253 Badong, Philippine Jurisdiction Over the George E. Roe Case, 32 PHILIPPINE L. J. 403, 407
(1957); Castro, U.S. Jurisdiction Over Armed Forces in the Philippines, 7 FAR EASTERN L. REV.
626, 649 (1960). But see Aguilar, Criminal Jurisdiction Under the Revised Bases Agreement, 41
PHILIPPINE L. J. 729, 746-49 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Aguilar]. One Philippine judge considers
that the obligation is personal to the commander and formed sufficient basis to hold the Com-
mander of Clark Air Force Base and the individual signing the custody receipt in contempt. The
Holman Contempt Order, 45 PHILIPPINE L.J. 387 (1970). The commander was ordered to pay a
fine of 1000 pesos and to be confined until he produced a Bernard Williams. See Williams v.
Rogers, 449 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1971), described at pp. 52-55 infra. The fine and imprisonment were
apparently never executed because of the intervention of the Philippine Foreign Secretary. Memo-
randum for Respondent, 36-39, United States of America v. Gaddi, G.R. No. L-33793 (Philippines
Sup. Ct. filed Nov. 22, 1971).
"I Act of Feb. 9, 1903, ch. 529, 32 Stat. 806; Act of Feb. 6, 1905, ch. 454, 33 Stat. 698. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 662(b), 666 (1940).
M" U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2, cl. 2; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3182-83 (1970).
2 Negotiations on the Philippine Bases Agreement commenced before Philippine independence.
Aguilar, supra note 283, at 729.
2v LORD McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 431 (1961); M. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J.
MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 186-87 (1967).
2 See pp. 44-47 supra.
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3. The Return of Civilians
The commentators mentioned in this part have found reasons to
imply an obligation to return only active duty servicemen. It has been
assumed without tluestion that military authorities do not have any
legitimate power to affect the liberty of such individuals, at least in the
United States. 89 If one assumes, however, that the SOFAs somehow
imbue such authorities with the right and obligation to return errant
servicemen, it is an easy step to apply the same arguments to the fugitive
civilian. The civilian employees of the military force and their depen-
dents enjoy many, if not all, benefits that the serviceman receives under
the SOFA as a result of their status.290 The procedural rights applicable
to a trial in the receiving state's courts apply equally to the civilian.291
For all practical purposes, the serviceman's civilian companions remain
in the receiving state the same length of time as he does and are consid-
ered by the local population as an integral part of the American military
community. In the later agreements, the military authorities have at
least the right and, in some cases, the obligation to exercise custody over
the civilians.292 In such cases the refusal to exercise the custody required
by the agreement would hardly form a basis for justifying a refusal to
return an individual who escapes because such custody was not actually
exercised.2 3 When it is considered that the escaping civilian may well
completely avoid prosecution or punishment for the offense involved
because of the failure of American law to make crimes committed by
its nationals abroad generally punishable in United States courts,294
there is a stronger reason to infer an obligation to return the civilian
than the military man who can be prosecuted under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice.
4. Inequity of Obligation Resulting from Custody
Besides the problems already discussed in deriving from the exercise
of custody an obligation for the United States to return individuals
where such custody fails to hold the individual in the receiving state,
there is a basic inequity in such a position. Imagine a very serious
29' Baldwin, supra note 117, at 90-9 1; Metzger and McMahon, supra note 51, at 624. See also
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 125, at 96.
n1 See, e.g., NATO SOFA, art. XI, para. 2(a).
211 Id. at art. VII, para. 9.
2 See, e.g., Philippine SOFA, Agreed Official Minutes, para. 5; Chinese SOFA, art. XIV, para.
5(c).
2" I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 923 (8th ed. Lauterpacht, 1955).
n' See notes 15-16 supra.
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offender in the hands of the receiving state after an initial arrest and
prior to being handed over to American authorities for custody, or
during trial proceedings, or while serving a legitimately adjudged long
prison sentence. If during such time the felon escapes from local author-
ities and leaves the receiving state, then he would not have to be returned
to the receiving state. A relatively minor offender released by local
police officials for an offense such as public drunkenness who complies
with apparently valid orders reassigning him to the United States would
have to be returned for his trial unless the receiving state agreed to waive
their right to have American authorities produce such a person.
It is true that such extreme examples of minor offenses would proba-
bly not result in much complaint from receiving states and the United
States would be able to dispense with any requirement to return minor
offenders where the cost of return would far exceed the worth of prose-
cution. However, similarly serious offenders might be treated unequally,
not on the basis of the gravity of the offense, but on the fortuitousness
of being in the custody of a foreign official rather than an American or
by cleverly concealing identity long enough to leave the receiving state.
Such a possibility is fundamentally unfair even if legally rational. To
avoid such a result, which the negotiators of any SOFA would have been
extremely unlikely to intend, it would seem preferable to construe the
custodial provisions only to require duties within the receiving state, if
at all possible.
It might be complained that such a construction would be bad faith
on the part of American officials, who would be in a position to subvert
local court procedure by exercising custody so ineffectively that any
accused can avoid local justice. It is submitted that the ordinary com-
mander deserves more credit than such an argument suggests. Most
SOFAs require that the views of the local authorities be given considera-
tion in the determination of the form custody is to take. Such views are
not binding 295 but must be accorded good faith. The individual accused
fleeing the receiving state is contributing to proof against himself and
the current trend of developing extradition treaties that may permit his
return296 to countries where extradition is not presently possible may
eventually redound against him. The present obligation of the United
States can reasonably be interpreted to require that custody be exercised
in good faith. Ordinarily the local commander will be able to make a
"I See, e.g., Spanish SOFA, art. XVIII, para. 3.
26 See note 22 supra. Extradition treaties are not considered void as ex post facto if applied to
offenses committed before the treaty becomes effective. 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 34, at 753-
57. See, e.g., the first cited Extradition Treaty with Argentina, supra note 22, at art. 22.
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considered judgment that will keep the individual available to local
authorities when required.
IV. THE RETURN OF SERVICEMEN IN THE COURTS
A. The Cases
While the foregoing discussion has centered on the sending state's
obligation, as much as it can be found in the SOFAs themselves, to
return fugitive individuals to the receiving state, only indirect reference
has been made to actual cases reaching the United States courts. While
there were no reported instances of servicemen or civilians contesting
military officials' attempts to return them to the receiving state during
the first decade and a half following the effective date of the NATO
SOFA, the 1970s have produced three generally reported federal court
efforts by four servicemen to block their impending return overseas,
where the obvious if not admitted reason for the proposed military
action was to surrender the individual to authorities of another nation
to permit it effectively to exercise its criminal jurisdiction in accordance
with a SOFA.
1. United States ex. rel. Stone v. Robinson27
In the first reported case, an airman fled Japan following his convic-
tion for robbery and attempted rape. Stone was an airman stationed in
Vietnam who committed the alleged offenses during a rest and recupera-
tion leave in Japan in March 1968. Japanese authorities duly notified
the Air Force of their intention to exercise Japan's primary jurisdiction
and Stone was eventually sentenced to six years imprisonment on Sep-
tember 8, 1968, one day after his enlistment would normally have ex-
pired. A month earlier he had signed a document extending his enlist-
ment for two months. This process was repeated several times to extend
his enlistment beyond September 1969. The extensions permitted the
United States to retain Stone in Air Force custody and gave him the
benefit of trial and appellate counsel at United States expense. During
the whole processing of Stone's case in the Japanese appellate system,
the Air Force kept him in a loose custody, restricting him to an Air
Base.298 Although the Japanese Supreme Court affirmed his conviction
on August 29, 1969, the Japanese authorities apparently took no imme-
197 309 F. Supp. 1261 (W.D. Pa. 1970), affd 431 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1970).
20 Stone spent from October 19 to December 7, 1968 in military confinement as a result of a
court-martial for offenses connected with the unauthorized absence during which he committed the
offenses tried by the Japanese Court. United States ex rel. Stone v. Robinson, 431 F.2d 548, 549
(3d Cir. 1970).
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diate steps to obtain his custody for service of the sentence and Stone
fled Japan by commercial aircraft on September 12, two weeks later.
Stone was soon apprehended by military police in Pennsylvania and
committed to a county jail. He then commenced a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding alleging that his extensions in the Air Force were void because
of coercion by military officials, as well as some technical irregularities
in their execution. 99 District Judge Rosenberg of the Western District
of Pennsylvania first found the extensions to be voluntary.m
The judge then proceeded to discuss the obligations of the Air Force
to return Stone to Japan. He indicated that in accepting the protection
and aid of counsel by the extensions, Stone had incurred "the responsi-
bility or duty to see that the obligations of the United States Govern-
ment as they concerned him were as well respected under all the circum-
stances."' ° Finding that the United States was obligated to turn Stone
over to Japanese authorities upon indictment for the offenses resulting
in the conviction, the judge found that custody could be redelegated to
the United States.302 Finding that the United States had an obligation
to retain such custody and that Stone himself "had an obligation to
make himself available when wanted by the Government of Japan,"W'
the court reasoned that Stone could not breach either of the obligations
by leaving Japan. When he did so, the United States Government was
compelled "to arrest and seize him, wherever it could find him, and
return him. 304 The court then stated:
Stone came voluntarily to Japan. He voluntarily accepted the hospital-
ity and benefits of that Government, and responsibility placed upon
him, while in that country, of complying with its law as regarded his
own conduct toward the citizens of Japan and the liability for such
penalty as was imposed by that country's law for any breach thereof
m United States ex rel. Stone v. Robinson, 309 F. Supp. 1261, 1262 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
Id. at 1265.
I' d. at 1265-66. It is unclear to this author why the Government of the United States pressed
an argument that the United States Air Force was obliged under the SOFA to return Airman Stone
to Japan. Under the Extradition Treaty with Japan, supra note 22, at arts. II, VII, Stone was
subject to extradition for the robbery conviction. Two possibilities are apparent. The habeas corpus
petition commenced quickly after Stone's apprehension and the government may have felt that the
Air Force could justify custody on the Japanese SOFA as well as Stone's absence; secondly, the
extradition procedure might have presented problems since the related conviction for attempted
rape would not be subject to extradition, id. at art. II, and Japan would theoretically have had to
pay the costs of the extradition, id. at art. VIII; 18 U.S.C. § 3195 (1970). See United States ex
rel. Stone v. Robinson, 309 F. Supp. 1261, 1262 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
302 United States ex rel. Stone v. Robinson, 309 F. Supp. 1261, 1267 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
Id. at 1268.
Id.
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by him. He had an obligation to the Government of Japan and he
cannot here disclaim it, anymore than can the United States repudiate
its treaty obligations." 5
The court concluded by holding that in some cases involving military
custody for the purpose of removing an individual to a "far distant
land", "interference with the functions and obligations of the executive
branch of the Government" might be warranted, but Stone's circum-
stances did not warrant habeas corpus. 06
Appellate review by the Third Circuit consisted primarily of consider-
ation of the validity of the extensions; finding ample basis for the Dis-
trict Court's determination that the extensions were valid, the appellate
court affirmed the validity of the Air Force custody of the petitioner. 07
On a petition for rehearing, the full Third Circuit rejected Stone's con-
tention that the validity of the Japanese conviction should have also
been considered by the panel and implied that the issue had been fully
and properly resolved by the District Court."8
The appellate panel was fully cognizant that the Air Force intended
to turn Stone over to Japanese authorities, 309 but did not consider the
validity of the proposed action, confining itself to the question of
whether the appellant was properly still in the Air Force.310 The court
therefore did not deal squarely with the question of the obligation of the
United States, through the Air Force, to consumate an action amount-
ing to extradition. In turning down Stone's request for review of the
Japanese conviction, the court indicated that the appellant was mis-
construing the nature of habeas corpus relief and that Air Force custody
was legal.3t ' The later litigants apparently realized that habeas corpus
would be unsuccessful and attacked the problem more directly by seek-
ing injunctions against any transfer of the serviceman back to the receiv-
ing state.
2. Williams v. Rogers3 11
The next case involved an Air Force sergeant who was arraigned
before a Philippine court for forcible abduction and attempted rape in
August 1969. Pursuant to the minutes accompanying the Philippine
3 Id. at 1269.
3 Id.
United States ex rel. Stone v. Robinson, 431 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1970).
Id. at 553.
30 Id. at 549.
310 Id.
'" Id. at 553.
31 449 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 926 (1972).
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SOFA, Williams was entrusted to the custody of the Commanding
Officer of Clark Air Force Base. This was accomplished by his physical
release to a lieutenant colonel in the base's Legal Office, with the officer
issuing a certificate that Williams "will be held ready to appear before
a duly constituted investigation or competent court of the Philippines
at such times and places as required."3 3 Several pretrial sessions en-
sued with Williams present, but before the actual trial, he received and
complied with change of station orders to Minot Air Force Base in
North Dakota. The orders were issued only because of a failure by Air
Force officials to place an administrative hold on Williams based upon
the pending Philippine charges. When Williams' departure was discov-
ered, the Philippine Government protested strongly through diplomatic
channels. Under Department of Defense direction, apparently with
State Department concurrence, the Air Force sought to correct its mis-
take by issuing new orders transferring Williams back to Clark Air Base
in the Philippines.31 1 Williams' response was a complaint in the District
Court for North Dakota seeking to enjoin the transfer as "illegal and
contrary to existing Air Force Regulations" and depriving "him of
certain constitutional rights in that such action would be tantamount to
an extradition to the Philippines . . . in the absence of an extradition
treaty. ' 3' After issuing a routine temporary restraining order. the
court granted Williams a preliminary injunction and hinted that it
would deal with the constitutional issues involved in the proposed trans-
fer after a full hearing. 36 However, after the elapse of the one year
period required by Air Force regulations between changes of station, the
District Court granted the Government's motion for summary judgment
and ruled that Williams was eligible for immediate transfer to the Phil-
ippines without discussing the propriety of the transfer as an extradition
to the Philippines.3 17 Apparently the Court followed the implications of
Orloff v. Willoughby38 which indicates that military discretion over
duty assignments is complete and beyond judicial review except for
determination of whether the individual is properly in a military serv-
ice. 319
Williams received, however, a much more thorough if no more suc-
m Williams v. Rogers, 449 F.2d 513, 516 (8th Cir. 1971).
I, d. at 519.
3, Williams v. Rodgers (sic), Civil No. 1027, Memorandum and Order Granting Preliminary
Injunction, 2-3 (D.N.D. May 22, 1970).
36 Id. at 5.
s Williams v. Rogers, 449 F.2d 513, 516 n.3 (8th Cir. 1971).
3. 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
31" Id. at 94. See also Cortright v. Resor, 447 F.2d 244, 246 (2d Cir. 1971).
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cessful consideration of his contentions from the Eighth Circuit. Taking
at face value Williams' claim that his transfer to the Philippines was
dictated by diplomatic rather than military considerations or discre-
tion, 320 the Court of Appeals noted that the matters "seemingly tran-
scend the heart and penumbra of Orloff."' The Court then considered
the history of Article XIII of the Bases Agreement with the Philippines
and found it "a valid and appropriate exercise of legislative and execu-
tive authority. ' 32 The Bases Agreement was authorized by a joint
resolution of Congress and "entrusted the President with broad powers
to withhold, acquire and retain military bases as he deemed necessary
for the mutual protection of [the United States] and the Philip-
pines. ' '32 The Court of Appeals then considered the Valentine case
and held it applicable as requiring some authority in law or treaty to
provide a basis for "surrender of fugitives by this country to an-
other." ' The Court concluded, however, that the Bases Agreement, as
modified by the criminal jurisdiction provisions furnished both author-
ity and compulsion for "the prompt return of Sergeant Williams to the
Philippines. '325 Since the President had power to negotiate the arrange-
ments involved in the SOFA, it was "not impermissible to find that he
has the correlative power to enforce the obligations of our servicemen
undertaken pursuant thereto. 32
Unfortunately the Court of Appeals did not explain what language
in the agreement required or authorized the United States to return
fugitive servicemen. The Court did not consider, nor did Williams ap-
parently contend, that any obligations were limited to Philippine terri-
tory.3" The Court did, however, recite four policy reasons supporting
the power to return Williams:
(a) The obvious interest of the military in securing the custody of
those of its personnel who are charged with the commission of crimes
by Philippine authorities pending their trial; (b) The impact and ad-
verse effect that an open and well-publicized breach of the solemn
obligations imposed on commanding officers by the custodial provi-
sions of Article XIII has upon the reputation and integrity of Ameri-
can Servicemen stationed in the Philippines and upon the military
3"' Williams v. Rogers, 449 F.2d 513, 519-20 (8th Cir. 1971).
321 Id. at 520.
3 Id.
323 Id. at 521.
324 Id.
=' Id..
3M' Id.
327 Williams v. Rodgers (sic), Complaint, Civil No. 1027 (D.N.D., filed Apr. 8, 1970).
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mission and the purposes of our bases there; (c) Our conviction that
custodial provisions of the kind involved here can have present and
future meaning and significance only if Armed Forces supervisory
personnel are deemed to possess the power to correct administrative
errors of the type that occurred here. (d) Our feeling that the benefit
to Sergeant Williams in being permitted to remain on base and in
American custody pending the final disposition of the Philippine pro-
ceedings against him produced a concomitant obligation to report and
appear when required to do so and to remain responsive to the curative
orders of superior officers if, as here, a mistake should occur through
inadvertance and oversight.3 8
Considering these factors, together with the following:
It is undisputed that he enjoyed the right and privilege of remaining
with his detachment during the Philippine court proceedings; he con-
cedes that he was orally informed . . . that he was to be placed on
"Administrative Hold"; and he does not dispute the defense (sic) con-
tention that he executed, on October 17, 1969, a written acknowledge-
ment to the effect that he was to appear in the Court of First Instance
on January 16, 1970, the next hearing date in the trial proceedings.32
The Eight Circuit concluded that "Sergeant Williams is not being un-
lawfully extradited and that he is obligated to promptly (sic) return to
the Philippines as ordered."
The Court of Appeals also found unwarranted any contention that the
trial in the Philippines might be unfair or politically motivated. 3 It
also determined that Sergeant Williams was not entitled to the probable
cause hearing of the type normally conducted in extradition proceedings
because the SOFA with the Philippines "neither imposes nor contem-
plates such a requirement."331 This conclusion is somewhat difficult to
accept if the Court viewed the SOFA as authorizing extradition, since
the extradition statute applies whenever there exists an extradition
treaty. The Philippine SOFA is not a treaty but the statute could argua-
bly apply to any international agreement. At any rate, such a hearing
would not have been expressly contrary to the terms of the SOFA and
would have avoided the problem of an Executive Agreement inconsist-
ent with an Act of Congress.333 Nevertheless, the appeal was unsuc-
cessful as was an attempt to obtain a writ of certiorari from the Su-
32 Williams v. Rogers, 449 F.2d 513, 521-22 (8th.Cir. 1971).
3n Id. at 522.
= Id.
331 Id.
33 Id. at 522-23.
3 See pp. 66-67 infra.
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preme Court.134 Sergeant Williams may have had the ultimate success,
however, when the Philippine proceedings resulted in his acquittal. 335
3. Holmes v. Laird 6
The most recently reported case involved two soldiers stationed in
West Germany. In July 1970, Privates Holmes and Tucker were ar-
rested on attempted rape and related charges. The two soldiers claimed
that investigation by military authorities resulted in a determination
that there was insufficient evidence to warrant prosecution. 3 7 Never-
theless the German authorities recalled their general waiver of the pri-
mary right to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the Supplemen-
tary Agreement. Trial in December 1970 resulted in conviction and a
sentence of three years imprisonment for both accused. While appellate
proceedings lasting until July 1971 were underway, the accused were
kept under a loose restriction at the unit to which they were assigned.
Shortly before the Bundesgerichtshof, the German Supreme Court, af-
firmed the accused's convictions and sentences, both were permitted to
take a leave from their Army station upon condition that they remain
in the Federal Republic. They nevertheless broke this limitation and
somehow returned to the United States, surrendering to Army officials
at the office of Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm. They were thereafter
placed in a military confinement facility but immediately initiated a suit
to enjoin the American military from transferring them to West Ger-
many, primarily because of claimed deficiencies in their German trial
relating to rights guaranteed them by the Status of Forces Agreement,
international law and the United States Constitution. 3 8
The District Court held that the United States had a valid and binding
obligation to return the accused to Germany for service of their sent-
ence; that any claim of defects in the West German trial arising from
the guarantees listed in the Status of Forces Agreement was beyond the
power of the court to correct; such claims were a proper matter to be
handled by the executive branch of the Government through diplomatic
channels. Accordingly the Government obtained its requested motion
for summary judgment without any inquiry into the validity of asser-
tions that the convictions had been obtained contrary to SOFA guaran-
3 Williams v. Rogers, 405 U.S. 926 (1972).
"I Interview with Will H. Carroll, civilian attorney with the International Law Division, Office
of the Judge Advocate General, United States Air Force in Washington, D. C. on March 1, 1973.
- 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972).
31 Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
338 Id.
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teed rights of speedy trial and confrontation of the witness(es).3 9
In the appellants' brief to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
Holmes and Tucker conceded the validity of the NATO Status of
Forces Agreement and the German Supplementary Agreementuo but
claimed a right to prove their assertions relating to the unfairness of the
German trial and thereby justify relief from any United States obliga-
tion to return them to Germany.3 41 The appellants also added a conten-
tion that the agreements were no longer applicable to them because they
were no longer in the territory of another Contracting Party.3
2
As did Williams from the Eighth Circuit, Holmes and Tucker re-
ceived thorough but unsuccessful consideration from the District of
Columbia Circuit. The Court noted that the Constitution could not be
applied to the German trial.343 It agreed with the District Court that
even assuming that the appellants were denied rights listed in the SOFA,
American courts were not empowered to review foreign criminal pro-
ceedings,344 and that such deprivations did not relieve the United States
of the obligation to surrender the accused once the convictions were
final.3 45 Additionally the Court noted that since another article of the
NATO SOFA which appellants claimed gave them certain rights pro-
vided that "all differences between the Contracting Parties relating to
the interpretation or application of the Agreement shall be settled by
negotiation without recourse to any outside jurisdiction,"' 6 the Court
was foreclosed from considering the appellants' arguments. The Court
then hinted some dissatisfaction at the Government's failure to deny
specifically the appellants contentions but reiterated its holding that
such matters were for executive discretion and not the courts.
347
In a footnote the Court disposed of the argument that the appellants
were beyond the territory where any American obligation to surrender
them existed, by stating:
[A]ppellants were in West Germany as members of a 'force' at the time
of the commission of the offenses with which they were charged. West
German jurisdiction then attached, and neither it nor the correlative
' Holmes v. Laird, Order, Civil Action No. 1159-71 (D.D.C. June 28, 1971).
S4 Brief for Appellants at 37, Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
I' ld. at 68.
311 Id. at 55-58.
m3 Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
14, Id. at 1218-19.
3 Id. at 1219-23.
346 NATO SOFA, art. XVI.
31 Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1223-25 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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American obligation to surrender was affected by appellants' subse-
quent unauthorized departure for the United States.
34 8
In the same footnote the Court of Appeals disposed of a related
argument that the return and surrender of the accused could be effected
only pursuant to an extradition treaty by indicating that the NATO
SOFA, "a treaty in every sense of the word," and the Supplementary
Agreement permitted the "executive branch to invade one's personal
liberty criminal proceedings.3 39 The Court failed to indicate exactly
what provision or provisions in the SOFA or the Supplementary Agree-
ment created this obligation transcending West Germany's borders. The
Court did recite the Stone, Williams, Girard and other cases as judicial
approval of surrender "without any intimation that a problem of unlaw-
ful extradition" was involved .30
The petition of the accused for a writ of certiorari was denied by the
Supreme Court in September 1972,111 but the pendency of habeas cor-
pus proceedings relating to the accused's pretrial confinement and mili-
tary status delayed their departure for Germany until February 1973.352
B. Judicial Theories Supporting The Return
At least three theories supporting the obligation of the United States
to return fugitive personnel in order to surrender them to a receiving
state are discernable in the above described cases.
"I Id. at 1219 n.59.
3,9 Id.
3 Id. at 1219-20 n.59.
"I Holmes v. Laird, 409 U.S. 869 (1972).
1 On December 23, 1971, Privates Holmes and Tucker filed petitions for habeas corpus in the
District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that their continued confinement in a military
facility pending decision of the validity of their forced return to West Germany was illegal. Private
Tucker also requested discharge from the United States Army because no charges were filed
against him before his term of enlistment expired. The petitions were dismissed by District Judge
J. Smith. Tucker v. Froelke, Order, Habeas Corpus No. 117-71 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 1972); Holmes v.
Laird, Order, Habeas Corpus No. 118-71 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 1972). The appeals from these orders
were dismissed on the motion of the appellants who indicated that they desired to be transferred
to West Germany to begin service of their sentence, since they had no assurances that the time
spent in a military stockade in Virginia would be credited to the German confinement period.
Tucker v. Froelke, Order, No. 72-1194 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 29, 1973); Holmes v. Laird, Order, No.
72-1195 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 29, 1973). The appellate court had indicated five months earlier, sua
sponte, that the appeals would be decided upon the briefs then filed and the record without oral
argument. See Holmes v. Laird, Order, No. 72-1195 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 31, 1972).
Privates Holmes and Tucker had earlier been unsuccessful in obtaining release from military
confinement in a petition for habeas corpus to the Court of Military Appeals. Holmes v. Laird,
21 U.S.C.M.A. 657, 44 C.M.R. 942 (1971).
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1. Personal Obligation of the Accused
Both the Stone and Williams cases contain language indicating that
partial justification for their return to Japan and the Philippines, respec-
tively, derived from the receipt by the accused of certain benefits attrib-
utable to the SOFA involved. These benefits of freedom from the cus-
tody of the receiving state and of financial aid in retention of local
counsel are deemed to obligate the accused personally to honor the
jurisdiction of the receiving state by submitting to its power and almost
to estop him from complaining of the effort of the armed service to help
enforce this personal obligation.3 53 The appellate government brief in
the Holmes case suggested that the accused lacked clean hands in their
unauthorized departure from Germany after receiving the benefit of
American custody and financial aid and were therefore not entitled to
any equitable injunctive relief. 54 Perhaps because of the appellants'
assertion that some of the benefits of NATO SOFA's fair trial guaran-
tees were in fact denied them, 35 the District of Columbia Circuit did
not in any manner justify its decision on this rationale.
The theory that an accused has an obligation to return could be
expanded to include the many benefits that any serviceman or civilian
derives from a SOFA, not only in the event of a criminal trial but also
in the customs and privileges areas. The many exemptions from customs
on much imported personal property of servicemen and civilians, the
easy and inexpensive acquisition of driving licenses and registration
plates and freedom from local receiving state income taxation, are only
some of the benefits that place the individual connected with an Ameri-
can military force operating under the umbrella of a SOFA in a privi-
leged position compared to both the ordinary tourist or visitor, and
indeed, the local resident."5 ' With these greater privileges, it can be
argued, should come a correlative greater obligation to submit to the
local courts upon the allegation of commission of offenses.
The personal obligation of the members of the overseas military com-
munities to obey the local law and to refrain from any action that would
defeat the receiving state from exercising jurisdiction is arguably also
found in a provision in all the SOFAs:
" United States ex rel. Stone v. Robinson, 309 F. Supp. 1261, 1265, 1268 (W.D. Pa. 1970);
Williams v. Rogers, 459 F.2d 513, 522 (8th Cir. 1971).
3m Brief for Appellee at 31-34, Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1972). But see Brief
for Appellants at 65-67, id.
3 Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
3 E. ELLERT, NATO FAIR TRIAL SAFEGUARDS 2 (1963).
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It is the duty of a force and its civilian component and the members
thereof as well as their dependents to respect the law of the receiving
State, and to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of
the present Agreement, and in particular, from any political activity
in the receiving State. It is also the duty of the sending State to take
necessary measures to that end.3"7
Because of the military reluctance to exercise custodial control over
civilian employees and dependents,35 the civilians encompassed by the
SOFAs may not receive the benefit, if it be such, of military custody
during the exercise of the receiving state's jurisdiction. However, in
cases where local authorities do not see fit to confine an accused civilian
pending his trial and appeal, such an accused will probably continue to
live in the military community and receive the various other benefits of
the SOFA. Although a civilian accused may not receive the financial
aid in a local criminal case in the manner received by the uniformed
serviceman, the civilian is entitled to the same guarantees of speedy
trial, confrontation of witnesses, compulsory process, an interpreter and
the presence of an American Government representative at his trial. 31,
Under regulations applicable to all overseas commanders, military au-
thorities are required to discourage the exercise of local jurisdiction over
civilians whenever the case can be appropriately disposed of through the
use of various administrative powers of the commander, such as a denial
of access to government facilities.6 0 The commander must also initiate
measures to invoke diplomatic intervention in any case where it appears
that the civilian will not receive a fair trial.36' Additionally, the civilian
overseas is much more likely to be a voluntary recipient of SOFA
benefits. Whereas the serviceman usually can not refuse his assignment
to a foreign country, his family is not compelled to accompany him nor
is the civilian employee forced to accept assignment outside the United
States .36
Thus civilians covered by the SOFAs, although perhaps to a lesser
degree, receive benefits quite similar to the uniformed serviceman and
should be under a similar obligation to subject themselves to a receiving
state's court. It would seem difficult for a court to nullify such an
37 NATO SOFA, art. I1. See also, e.g., Icelandic SOFA, art. 2, para. l(b); Korean SOFA,
art. VII; Spanish SOFA, art. XIV.
See pp. 19-21 supra.
' See. e.g., NATO SOFA, art. VII, para. 9; Pakistani SOFA, Annex B, para. 9; Seychelles
SOFA, para. 10(i); Australian SOFA, art. 8, para. 9.
' AR 27-50, para. 4.
361 Id.
362 See J. MACY, PUBLIC SERVICE 236 (1971).
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obligation for civilians, if indeed one exists for servicemen, merely be-
cause the benefits are of a slightly lesser quantity; their voluntary ac-
ceptance would seem to offset any such deficiency.
On a purely equitable basis, the inference of a United States right to
enforce the individual's own obligation to submit to the lawful exercise
of jurisdictional authority by the receiving state has great appeal. It
emphasizes the moral obligations of the individual. American custody
and financial aid were the benefits mentioned in the Stone and Williams
cases. It is highly questionable, however, whether an accused in such a
position has any right to insist on these benefits, which are somewhat
gratuitous. Congressional appropriations may fail to provide for the
cost of local counsel. United States custody, although encouraged by the
applicable regulations, need not always be exercised .1 3 With respect
to the other rights listed in the fair trial portion of the SOFAs, the
failure of the Holmes case to examine claimed violations leaves an
accused apparently subject solely to the discretion of his military and
civilian superiors to insure that such benefits are actually bestowed .3
The primary difficulty with the theory that the accused must submit
himself to the receiving state's jurisdiction is its equitable nature. A
moral obligation of an individual is usually irrelevant when constitu-
tional issues are involved. The Valentine case principle that clear au-
thority is needed to permit the United States to surrender an individual
to a foreign government has constitutional foundations in the Fifth
Amendment prohibition against deprivation of liberty without due pro-
cess of law.365 Even transfer of arrested individuals between districts in
the Federal Court system invokes a process covered by Federal Rules
derived from Congressional enactment. 66 Extradition among the states
is authorized by the Constituion and governed in some detail by stat-
ute. 67 Similarly any transfer of individuals to a foreign country with a
view toward criminal proceedings should be based on clear obligations
and authority to effect such a transfer, not vague moral obligations of
the person being surrendered.
2. Continuing Jurisdiction of the Receiving State
The Holmes case indicates that West German jurisdiction attached
at the time of the offense and could not be defeated by the unauthorized
AR 27-50, para. 4.
• Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
M U.S. CONSI., amend. V; Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 9 (1936).
' See FED. R. CRIM. P. 40.
U.S. CONST., art. IV § 2, cl. 2; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3182-83 (1970).
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departure of Holmes and Tucker."' In view of the Supplementary
Agreement's provisions relating to a conditional waiver of jurisdiction
over all offenses subject only to a recall after notification, the right to
exercise such jurisdiction would probably attach only after the recall.
Such a recall was, however, effected in the case.3 16
The Court of Appeals was presumably referring to the subject matter
jurisdiction since effective German control of Holmes and Tucker
ceased as long as the two accused were beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of the court or German authorities. Thus the ultimate issue to be re-
solved was the existence of an American obligation to assist West Ger-
many by restoring Holmes and Tucker to effective West German con-
trol. The Court of Appeals justified the return of the two to Germany
by indicating that the obligation of the United States to surrender the
accused was correlative with the attachment of jurisdiction and did
survive the accused's apparently successful removal of their status as
members of the force by departure from West Germany.370 By referring
to the attachment of jurisdiction, the Court appears to have ignored the
main thrust of the appellants' assertion that their departure from West
Germany terminated any American obligation under the SOFA and
Supplementary Agreement and forced West Germany to rely on other
appropriate means to regain control, such as extradition.37 ' It appears
that the Holmes reasoning skips a logical step in justifying the obliga-
tion to surrender upon the subject matter jurisdiction. The appellants
could hardly deny that West Germany had inchoate territorial jurisdic-
tion over the alleged offense. The issue was whether the United States
was required to help in making such jurisdiction practically effective.
The court was more sound in approving the surrender by virtue of the
world-wide applicability of the obligation to surrender the accused, 32
although such a conclusion may have been questionable based upon the
discussion in Part III above.
If, however, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' reasoning is
accepted, a receiving state's jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the
forces would be equally viable. Thus the United States' obligation to
arrest and surrender civilians should transcend the borders of the receiv-
ing state and subject such civilians to the same treatment received by
Holmes and Tucker. The existence of such a power in United States
m Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1219 n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
ml Id. at 1214; German Supplementary Agreement, art. 22, para. 3.
310 Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1219 n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
311 Brief for Appellants at 55-57, Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
322 Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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military authorities is open to question and may never be tested because
of reluctance exercise it.373 Such a power is inevitably related to the
actual custody which the United States assumes only over the uniformed
serviceman. While most of the SOFAs condition the custodial right on
a request by the United States or the sending state, 34 some provisions
almost compel the United States to accept custody of civilians.3 5 If the
agreements require such, the refusal of the United States to accept
custody in the receiving state would hardly serve as justification for
refusing to arrest the fugitive civilian and return him to the receiving
state for trial or punishment.
3. SOFAs as Extradition Treaties
The Holmes case indicates that the NATO SOFA as supplemented
by the German agreement is equivalent to an extradition treaty.37 The
Eighth Circuit in Williams hints at the same proposition in concluding
that he was not being unlawfully extradited. 377 Labelling the agree-
ments formally as extradition treaties was probably avoided since doing
such would have invoked the applicability of the Codal provisions re-
quiring an examination of the case by an extradition magistrate and the
final determination by the Secretary of State as to the propriety of the
proposed extradition.378 Arguably, the intended action of the military
authorities to expand United States effort to return the fugitive service-
men contrasts with normal extradition where the requesting country
assumes custody of the fugitive in the United States, pays most of the
extradition expenses and carries the fugitive back to the requesting
state.37
9
There is no hint in the statutory provisions of the United States Code
dealing with international extradition that Congress intended to limit
the procedures solely to Senate approved and formally ratified treat-
ies. 380 Some of the debates in the House of Representatives in 1848
indicate that a regularization of procedures whenever the United States
3 See p. 19 supra.
37' See, e.g., Spanish SOFA, art. XVIII, para. 3.
3 Philippine SOFA, Agreed Official Minutes, para. 5; Chinese SOFA, art. XIV, para 5(c);
New Zealand SOFA, Memorandum of Understandings, para. 4(c). The Korean SOFA, art. XXII,
para. 5(c) requires United States military authorities to retain custody of all personnel in their
hands, but permits transfer to Korean authorities at any time. See also Japanese SOFA, Agreed
Minutes, art. XVII, Re para. 5.
3' Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1219 n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
3 Williams v. Rogers, 449 F.2d 513, 522 (8th Cir. 1971).
:78 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184-86 (1970).
57 Id. at §§ 3186, 3195.
u, Id. at §§ 3181, 3184.
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had an obligation to extradite was intended, so that responsible police
officials could respond intelligently to extradition requests.
381
If the SOFAs are treated as equivalent to extradition treaties, they
should logically be as applicable to civilians, even including discharged
servicemen, in compelling the United States to produce a fugitive who
allegedly committed or was convicted of an offense subject to the receiv-
ing state's jurisdiction while that person was in a position encompassed
within the SOFA's definitions. This would be true in any case unless the
obligation to extradite is somehow contingent upon the assumption of
custody by the United States. As indicated above, the Philippine,
Chinese and arguably, the Japanese SOFAs do not depend on United
States willingness to accept custody but require local authorities to hand
over both servicemen and civilians.382 It would seem inappropriate on
an international law level to use a refusal to assume actual custody,
which the United States is required to exercise by the agreement, to
justify a denial of the obligations resulting from that required responsi-
bility. 383
The possibility of treating the SOFAs as extradition treaties was not
fully explored by the cases. Without a fuller development of this theory
in the courts or an attempt to use a SOFA as such before an extradition
proceeding, it is at best speculative to assume that the cases stand for
such a proposition.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The limited goal of this paper has been to determine what, if any,
obligations the United State has under SOFAs to return personnel who
allegedly commit crimes while in a foreign state as part of an American
military community. The varied nature of the relevant provisions give
rise to considerations that result in dissimilar obligations from country
to country. The earliest SOFA with the Philippines and the newest one
with Spain arguably require the return of any individual over whom the
United States military authorities have acquired custody pursuant to the
agreement .3  The lack of territorial limitations in the SOFAs with
Iceland and Libya as well as the expired one with Pakistan provide
substantial support for a conclusion that all personnel accused of crimes
subject to those countries' primary right to exercise jurisdiction should
be returned if they depart before punishment, regardless of whether the
as 18 CONG. GLOBE 868 (1848).
382 See note 375 supra.
a See 14 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 34, at 282-83 (1970).
a" See pp. 44-47 supra.
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particular individual has been subjected to American custody within the
foreign nation.38 A similar obligation exists with respect to offenders
who have been released to American custody in Japan because of the
definition of personnel involved in the custody provision itself.386 In all
the other countries considered, there are substantial obstacles to finding
any inferred obligation to return fugitive personnel .3
To overcome the territorial limitations and the difficulties with the
loss of status, it has been suggested that policy considerations supply the
missing link.3 Custody actually exercised by American military au-
thorities has also been simultaneously advanced as implying an obliga-
tion to return.39 It is submitted, however, that such political considera-
tions lead in the opposite direction and should be resolved in advance
rather than on an ad hoc basis in each case. Using the custody basis
alone has a potential for extremely inequitable results 9.39
To the extent that the SOFAs are read to require return of only
servicemen, they are creating problems of equal protection for all per-
sonnel who are similarly subject to the jurisdiction of the receiving
state.39 ' Freely returning servicemen may also work against the desira-
ble goal of a rational extradition policy that should permit the extradi-
tion of any American citizen or national for any serious offense commit-
ted outside the United States. 392
The decisions of the courts in the three cases discussed should be
reconsidered. The holding of the district court in Stone was probably
valid because of the particular terms of the Agreed Official Minutes in
30 See pp. 31-33 and p. 38 supra.
3" Japanese SOFA, Agreed Minutes, art. XVII, Re Para. 5, para. 1.
38 See Chapter III supra.
3" Metzger and McMahon, supra note 51, at 635, 638. See also Williams v. Rogers, 349 F.2d
513, 521-22 (8th Cir. 1971).
38 Metzger and McMahon, supra note 51, at 637-38.
3M See p. 50 supra.
31 See note 245 supra.
See note 22 supra, indicating that all but one American extradition treaty signed since the
decision in Valentine v. United States ex reL Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936) has provided for
discretionary surrender of American citizens or nationals. Besides the indicated recent treaties,
other extradition treaties have been signed or substantially agreed to with the following countries:
Denmark (see note 144 supra); West Germany, 65 DEP'T STATE BULL. 47 (No. 1672, July 12 1971);
Canada, id. at 741 (No. 1969, Dec. 27, 1971); Australia, 66 id. at 456 (No. 1708, Mar. 20, 1972);
United Kingdom, 67 id. at 56 (No. 1724, July 10, 1972); and Ireland, id. at 146 (No. 1727, July
31, 1972). If all these treaties are eventually ratified and the apparent activist trend in negotiating
new extradition treaties continues with provision for mandatory or permissive extradition of Amer-
ican nationals, there will be diminished need for the use of SOFAs to accomplish the same result.
A refusal to use the SOFAs could spur other countries to negotiate extradition treaties with the
United States permitting extradition not only of servicemen and their civilian counterparts, but
any American committing an offense abroad.
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that SOFA .1 3 The decision in the Williams case may have reached the
correct result but the reasons advanced are tenuous. If there was no
obligation to return Sergeant Williams, one should not have been con-
structed out of the political and diplomatic ramifications involved in the
case.394 The Holmes case is probably erroneous in finding an obligation
to return the individuals based on the SOFA and the German Supple-
mentary Agreement.3 95
In spite of this author's opinion, it seems clear that the trio of cases
has created substantial precedent for the inference of an obligation to
return personnel entrusted to American custody in all the SOFAs.
3 1
The denial of certiorari must be treated cautiously, however.397 Only
the Holmes case in the appellate court dealt directly with the problem
of an obligation existing outside the receiving state, and the handling
of the issue was dubious. 98
This paper has not considered several related problems in this area
that may be involved in any future cases. The SOFAs are predominantly
a creature of executive agreement.399 The process of returning even
servicemen to fulfill obligations thereunder is so closely related to extra-
dition that it should be considered as such. Since extradition is tradition-
ally handled by the formal treaty method,' °° SOFAs should be submit-
ted to the same process if they are to create the same obligations. What
can and cannot be done through executive agreements has been the
subject of considerable debate in legal circles and the creation of an
obligation affecting individual liberty within the area where the Consti-
tution clearly applies is arguably not a proper subject for such pacts.'10
Even if such an obligation can be created without Senate participa-
tion, a large issue is raised procedurally. The extradition procedure in
international cases has been firmly established by statute and practice.40 2
... Actually it is unclear whether Stone was formally released to American authorities pursuant
to the Japanese SOFA, Agreed Minutes, art. XVII, Re para. 5, para. 1. See United States ex.
rel. Stone v. Robinson, 309 F. Supp. 1261, 1263 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
34 See pp. 46-47 and pp. 54-55 supra.
9 See pp. 41-49 supra.
39 See Chapter IV supra.
117 See Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 844, 844-45 (1950) (J. Frankfurter Memorandum).
3M See pp. 62-63 supra.
" Only NATO SOFA was formally submitted to the Senate for approval. Arguably the
Japanese SOFA has also been consented to by the Senate at least for application in the Ryukyu
Islands (Okinawa). See note 107 supra.
141 All the extradition treaties cited in notes 14, 21 and 22 supra were submitted to the Senate
and approved in the manner envisioned by the Constitution.
41 See Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Reply, 54 YALE L. J. 616, 631 (1945).
4o1 See 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 34, at 737-1122.
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The Congressional scheme envisions substantial participation by the
courts. Although it is clear that the extradition hearing is not in itself a
criminal proceding, it does offer substantial due process." 3 The
SOFAs, as noted by the Eighth Circuit, do not contemplate such a
procedure.' 0 ' A considerable argument may be advanced, however, that
such a procedure would not be inconsistent with a SOFA to determine
whether the individual is subject to the obligation claimed to exist by
American officials.' It would seem fairer for the United States to
commence such proceedings and prove their obligations in a manner
that must be done in extradition proceedings rather than to force an
accused in custody to resort to the courts on short notice before the
military establishment efficiently and quickly returns him to the receiv-
,ing state and the issue has become moot.
Finally a question may be raised, even if one assumes that the SOFAs
and Supplementary Agreements create no obligation to return person-
nel, as to the power of the military services over their own personnel.
Thus, as the Government contended in the Holmes case, the Army
might be free to return an individual to a receiving state to dispose
properly of military offenses committed either in the departure or prior
thereto. 06 Even if such an action is considered a clear subterfuge, it
might also be submitted that an order to return an individual to a
receiving state or the use of physical force to accomplish that end, would
serve a valid military purpose.07 The welfare of all other personnel in
the receiving state would be considerably enhanced by such action.
This paper, however, proposes no solutions to the above questions.
+ 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1970).
W' illiams v. Rogers, 449 F.2d 513, 522-23 (8th Cir. 1971).
"0 See p. 39 supra. See also Metzger and McMahon, supra note 51, at 629 n.59. Those authors
disagree on whether a hearing of any sort must be accorded to persons returned pursuant to a
SOFA. The suggestion by Captain McMahon that military judges be designated to hold hearings
offers some merit but the authority would be based almost exclusively upon regulatory action of a
Departmental Secretary since the statutory authority for decisions by military judges is generally
considered limited to cases actually referred to trial by court-martial. 10 U.S.C. §§ 826, 839 (1970).
If the SOFAs actually provide a basis for return of personnel to the foreign state, this author is
inclined to agree with only to the right of access to Federal Courts to prevent the action. See United
States ex. rel. Martinez-Angosto, 344 F.2d 673, 688 (2d Cir. 1965) (Friendly, J., concurring); Sayne
v. Shipley, 418 F.2d 679, 686 (5th Cir. 1969).
"m Brief for Appellee at 31 n.20, Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
407 But see Metzger and McMahon, supra note 51, at 622-29, where the authors conclude that
the United States armed forces probably do not have inherent authority to return servicemen to a
foreign country for the purpose of surrendering the individual apart from any SOFA obligation.
Cf United States v. Nixon, 21 U.S.M.C.A. 480, 484,45 C.M.R. 254, 258 (1972), where the highest
military court indicated that a refusal to get into a jeep to proceed to pretrial confinement could
not generate a basis for prosecution of a violation of an order. Instead, indicated the court, military
authorities should have employed reasonable force to accomplish the pretrial confinement.
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In considering those problems, however, it is submitted that there is no
obligation under most of the SOFAs and Supplementary Agreements
to return or to extradite any person to the receiving state involved. The
fugitive problem should be resolved by traditional methods, such as
extradition, by a determination that the United States or its military
authorities have a power to return the individual independent of any
SOFA, or by trying the accused in the United States for his offense.
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APPENDIX A
ARTICLE VII, NATO SOFA
1. Subject to the Provisions of this Article,
(a) the military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise within the
receiving State all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law
of the sending State over all persons subject to the military law of that State;
(b) the authorities of the receiving State shall have jurisdiction over the members of a force
or civilian component and their dependents with respect to offences committed within
the territory of the receiving State and punishable by the law of that State.
2. (a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of that State with respect to
offences, including offences relating to its security, punishable by the law of the sending
State, but not by the law of the receiving State.
(b) The authorities of the receiving State shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdic-
tion over members of a force or civilian component and their dependents with respect
to offences, including offences relating to the security of that State, punishable by its
law but not by the law of the sending State.
(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and of paragraph 3 of this Article a security offence
against a State shall include
(i) treason against the State;
(ii) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to official secrets of that
State, or secrets relating to the national defence of that State.
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following rules shall apply:
(a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction over a member of a force or of a civilian component in relation to
(i) offences solely against the property or security of that State, or offences solely
against the person or property of another member of the force or civilian compo-
nent of that State or of a dependent;
(ii) offences arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official
duty.
(b) In the case of any other offence the authorities of the receiving State shall have the
primary right to exercise jurisdiction.
(c) If the State having the primary right decides not to exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify
the authorities of the other State as soon as practicable. The authorities of the State
having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the
authorities of the other State for a waiver of its right in cases where that other State
considers such waiver to be of particular importance.
4. The foregoing provisions of this Article shall not imply any right for the military authorities
of the sending State to exercise jurisdiction over persons who are nationals of or ordinarily
resident in the receiving State, unless they are members of the force of the sending State.
5. (a) The authorities of the receiving and sending States shall assist each other in the arrest
of members of a force or civilian component or their dependents in the territory of
the receiving State and in handing them over to the authority which is to exercise
jurisdiction in accordance with the above provisions.
(b) The authorities of the receiving State shall notify promptly the military authorities of
the sending State of the arrest of any member of a force or civilian component or a
dependent.
(c) The custody of an accused member of a force or civilian component over whom the
receiving State is to exercise jurisdiction shall, if he is in the hands of the sending State,
remain with that State until he is charged by the receiving State.
6. (a) The authorities of the receiving and sending States shall assist each other in the
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carrying out of all necessary investigations into offences, and in the collection and
production of evidence, including the seizure and, in proper cases, the handing over of
objects connected with an offence. The handing over of such objects may, however,
be made subject to their return within the time specified by the authority delivering
them.
(b) The authorities of the Contracting Parties shall notify one another of the disposition
of all cases in which there are concurrent rights to exercise jurisdiction.
7. (a) A death sentence shall not be carried out in the receiving State by the authorities of
the sending State if the legislation of the receiving State does not provide for such
punishment in a similar case.
(b) The authorities of the receiving State shall give sympathetic consideration to a request
from the authorities of the sending State for assistance in carrying out a sentence of
imprisonment pronounced by the authorities of the sending State under the provision
of this Article within the territory of the receiving State.
8. Where an accused has been tried in accordance with the provisions of this Article by the
authorities of one Contracting Party and has been acquitted, or has been convicted and is
serving, or has served, his sentence or has been pardoned, he may not be tried again for the,
same offence within the same territory by the authorities of another Contracting Party.
However, nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the military authorities of the sending State
from trying a member of its force for any violation of rules of discipline arising from an act
or omission which constituted an offence for which he was tried by the authorities of another
Contracting Party.
9. Whenever a member of a force or civilian component or a dependent is prosecuted under the
jurisdiction of a receiving State he shall be entitled-
(a) to a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) to be informed, in advance of trial of the specific charge or charges made against him;
(c) to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
(d) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, if they are within
the jurisdiction of the receiving State;
(e) to have legal representation of his own for his defence or to have free or assisted legal
representation under the conditions prevailing for the time being in the receiving State;
(f) if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent interpreter; and
(g) to communicate with a representative of the Government of the sending State and,
when the rules of the court permit to have such a representative present at this trial.
10. (a) Regularly constituted military units or formations of a force shall have the right to
police any camps, establishments or other premises which they occupy as the result of
an agreement with the receiving State. The military police of the force may take all
appropriate measures to ensure the maintenance of order and security on such prem-
ises.
(b) Outside these premises, such military police shall be employed only subject to arrange-
ments with the authorities of the receiving State and in liaison with those authorities,
and in so far as such employment is necessary to maintain discipline and order among
the members of the force.
II. Each Contracting Party shall seek such legislation as it deems necessary to ensure the ade-
quate security and protection within its territory of installations, equipment, property, records
and official information of other Contracting Parties, and the punishment of persons who may
contravene laws enacted for that purpose.
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APPENDIX B
ARREST AND CUSTODY PROVISIONS OF STATUS OF
FORCES AGREEMENTS OTHER THAN NATO SOFA
I. Icelandic SOFA, art. 2, para. 6:
(a) The authorities of the United States and Iceland shall assist each other in the arrest
of members of the United States forces and their dependents who commit offenses in
Iceland and in handing them over to the authorities which are to exercise jurisdiction
in accordance with the above provisions.
(c) The custody of an accused over whom Iceland is to exercise jurisdiction shall, if he is
in the hands of the authorities of the United States, remain in the hands of such
authorities until he is charged by Iceland.
2. Provisions in Japanese SOFA (similar provisions were contained in the Former Japanese
SOFA):
Article XVII, para. 5:
(a) The military authorities of the United States and the authorities of Japan shall assist
each other in the arrest of members of the United States armed forces, the civilian
component, or their dependents in the territory of Japan and in handing them over to
the authority which is to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the above provisions.
(c) The custody of an accused member of the United States armed forces or the civilian
component over whom Japan is to exercise jurisdiction shall, if he is in the hands of
Agreed Minutes to the Japanese SOFA:
Article XVII
Re paragraph 5:
(1) In case the Japanese authorities have arrested an offender who is a member of the
United States armed forces, the civilian component, or a dependent subject to the
military law of the United States with respect to a case over which Japan has the
primary right to exercise jurisdiction, the Japanese authorities will, unless they deem
that there is adequate cause and necessity to retain such offender, release him to the
custody of the United States military authorities provided that he shall, on request,
be made available to the Japanese authorities, if such be the condition of his release.
The United States authorities shall, on request, transfer his custody to the Japanese
authorities at the time he is indicted by the latter.
(2) The United States military authorities shall promptly notify the Japanese authorities
of the arrest of any member of the United States armed forces, the civilian component
or a dependent in any case in which Japan has the primary right to exercise jurisdic-
tion.
3. Libyan SOFA, art. XX:
(3) The United States and Libyan authorities will assist each other in the arrest and
handing over to the appropriate authority of members of the United States forces for
trial in accordance with the above provisions, and the Libyan authorities will immedi-
ately notify the United States authorities if they arrest any member of the United
States forces. The Libyan authorities will, if the United States authorities request the
release on remand of an arrested member of the United States forces, release him from
their custody on the United States authorities' undertaking to present him to the
Libyan courts for investigatory proceedings and trial when required.
4. Nicaraguan SOFA, art. IX, para. (4):
(a) The authorities of the United States of America and the authorities of Nicaragua shall
assist each other in the arrest of members of the United States Coast Guard in the
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territory of Nicaragua and in handing them over to the authority which is to exercise
jurisdiction in accordance with the above provisions.
(c) The custody of an accused member of the United States Coast Guard over whom
Nicaragua is to exercise jurisdiction shall be the responsibility of the United States of
America pending completion of judicial proceedings. The United States authorities
will make such an accused immediately available to the authorities of Nicaragua, upon
their request, for purposes of investigation and trial.
5. Pakistani SOFA, Annex B, para. 5:
(a) The authorities of Pakistan and the United States shall assist each other in the arrest
of members of the Unit and in handing them over to the authority which is to exercise
jurisdiction in accordance with the above provisions.
(c) The custody of an accused member of the Unit, over whom Pakistan is to exercise
jurisdiction, shall remain with the United States. The United States assumes the
responsibility for custody pending conclusion of judicial proceedings. The United
States authorities will make any member of the Unit immediately available to Paki-
stan authorities upon their request for purposes of investigation and trial.
6. West Indies SOFA, art. IX, para. (5):
(a) To the extent authorised by law, the authorities of the Territory and the military
authorities of the United States shall assist each other in the service of process and in
the arrest of members of the United States Forces in the Territory and in handing them
over to the authorities which are to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the provi-
sions of this Article.
(c) Unless otherwise agreed, the custody of an accused member of the United States
Forces over whom the authorities of a Territory are to exercise jurisdiction shall, if
he is in the hands of the United States authorities, remain with the United States
authorities until he is charged. In cases where the United States may have the responsi-
bility for custody pending the completion of judicial proceedings, the United States
authorities shall, upon request, make such a person immediately available to the
authorities of the Territory for purposes of investigation and trial and shall give full
consideration to any special views of such authorities as to the way in which custody
should be maintained.
Note: Almost identical provisions appear in Bahaman SOFA, art. VI, para. (5)(a) and (c), Indian
Ocean SOFA, Annex 1I, para. l(e)(i) and (iii), and Seychelles SOFA, para. (10)(e)(i) and (iii).
7. Australian SOFA, art. 8, para. (5):
(a) The military authorities of the United States and the authorities of Australia shall
assist each other in accordance with arrangements to be agreed to by them in the arrest
of members of the United States Forces or of the civilian component or of dependants
in Australia and in handing them over to the authority which is to exercise jurisdiction
in accordance with the above provisions.
(c) The custody of an accused member of the United States Forces or of the civilian
component or of a dependent over whom Australia is to exercise jurisdiction shall, if
he is in the hands of the United States authorities, remain with the United States to
the extent authorized by United States law until he is charged by Australia.
8. Provisions in Philippine SOFA:
Paragraph 5:
(a) The appropriate authorities of the Republic of the Philippines and the appropriate
authorities of the United States shall assist each other in the arrest of members of
the United States armed forces or civilian component and their dependents in the
Republic of the Philippines and in handing them over to the authority which is to
exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the above provisions.
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(c) The custody of an accused member of the United States armed forces or civilian
component or dependent over whom the Republic of the Philippines is to exercise
jurisdiction shall, if he is in the hands of the United States, remain with the United
States until he is charged by the Republic of the Philippines.
b. Agreed Official Minutes:
5. In all cases over which the Republic of the Philippines exercises jurisdiction, the
custody of an accused member of the United States armed forces, civilian component,
or dependent, pending investigation, trial and final judgment, shall be entrusted with-
out delay to the commanding officer of the nearest base, who shall acknowledge in
writing (a) that such accused has been delivered to him for custody pending investiga-
tion, trial and final judgment in a competent court of the Philippines and (b) that he
will be made available to the Philippine authorities for investigation upon their request
and (c) that he will be produced before said court when required by it. The command-
ing officer shall be furnished by the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) with a copy of the
information against the accused upon the filing of the original in the competent court.
9. Provisions of Chinese SOFA:
Article XIV, para. 5:
(a) The appropriate authorities of the United States and the authorities of the Republic
of China will undertake, within the limits of their authority, to assist each other in
the arrest of members of the United States armed forces or civilian component, and
their dependents, in the Agreement Area and in handing them over to the authority
which is to have custody in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
(c) The custody of an accused member of the United States armed forces or civilian
component, or a dependent, shall be promptly entrusted to the military authorities of
the United States pending conclusion of all judicial proceedings. The United States
military authorities will make any member of the United States armed forces or
civilian component or their dependents, over whom the Republic of China is to exercise
jurisdiction immediately available to the authorities of the Republic of China upon
their request for purpose of investigation and trial.
Agreed Minutes to Article XIV:
Re paragraph 5(c)
1. (a) Where jurisdiction is exercised by the military authorities of the United States,
custody of members of the armed forces or the civilian component, or depen-
dents, shall rest with the military authorities of the United States.
(b) Where jurisdiction is exercised by the Chinese authorities, custody of members
of the armed forces or the civilian component, or dependents, shall rest with the
military authorities of the United States in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3
of this agreed minute.
2. (a) Where the arrest has been made by the Chinese authorities, the arrested person
shall be handed over to the military authorities of the United States if such
authorities so request.
(b) Where the arrest has been made by the military authorities of the United States
or where the arrested person has been handed over to them under subparagraph
(a) of this paragraph, they:
(i) may transfer custody to the Chinese authorities at any time; and
(ii) shall give sympathetic consideration to any request for the transfer of cus-
tody which may be made by the Chinese authorities in specific cases.
(c) In respect of offenses directed solely against the security of the Republic of
China, custody shall rest with the Chinese authorities in accordance with such
arrangements as may be made to that effect with the military authorities of the
United States.
3. Where custody rests with the military authorities of the United States in accordance
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with paragraph 2 of this agreed minute, it shall remain with such authorities until the
conclusion of all judicial proceedings held in accordance with this Article. The military
authorities of the United States shall make the arrested person available to the Chinese
authorities for investigation and criminal proceedings and shall take all appropriate
measures to that end and to prevent any prejudice to the course of justice. They shall
take full account of any special request regarding custody made by the competent
Chinese authorities.
4. The United States shall retain the right to keep in custody the arrested person either
in a detention institution of its own or with its armed forces. In order to ensure smooth.
implementation of the obligations imposed by the second sentence of paragraph 3 of
this agreed minute, the military authorities of the United States shall keep the arrested
person, where possible, in the vicinity of the seat of the Chinese authority dealing with
the case; this, however, shall not constitute an obligation on their part to keep the
arrested person outside the area in use by the United States armed forces.
10. Korean SOFA, art. XXII, para. 5:
(a) The military authorities of the United States and the authorities of the Republic of
Korea shall assist each other in the arrest of members of the United States armed
forces, the civilian component, or their dependents in the territory of the Republic of
Korea and in handing them over to the authority which is to have custody in accord-
ance with the following provisions.
(c) The custody of an accused member of the United States armed forces or civilian
component, or of a dependent, over whom the Republic of Korea is to exercise jurisdic-
tion shall, if he is in the hands of the military authorities of the United States, remain
with the military authorities of the United States pending the conclusion of all judicial
proceedings and until custody is requested by the authorities of the Republic of Korea.
If he is in the hands of the Republic of Korea, he shall, on request, be handed over to
the military authorities of the United States and remain in their custody pending
completion of all judicial proceedings and until custody is requested by the authorities
of the Republic of Korea. When an accused has been in the custody of the military
authorities of the United States, the military authorities of the United States may
transfer custody to the authorities of the Republic of Korea at any time, and shall give
sympathetic consideration to any request for the transfer of custody which may be
made by the authorities of the Republic of Korea in specific cases. The military
authorities of the United States shall promptly make any such accused available to
the authorities of the Republic of Korea upon their request for purposes of investiga-
tion and trial, and shall take all appropriate measures to that end and to prevent any
prejudice to the course of justice. They shall take full account of any special request
regarding custody made by the authorities of the Republic of Korea. The authorities
of the Republic of Korea shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the
military authorities of the United States for assistance in maintaining custody of an
accused member of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, or a
dependent.
(d) In respect of offenses solely against the security of the Republic of Korea provided in
paragraph 2(c), an accused shall be in the custody of the authorities of the Republic
of Korea.
11. Spanish SOFA, art. XVIII:
I. Within the limits of their respective legal powers, the military authorities of the United
States and the authorities of Spain shall mutually assist each other in the arrest of
members of the United States personnel in Spain who are in Spanish territory.
2. The authorities of Spain shall immediately notify the military authorities of the United
States of the arrest of any member of the United States personnel in Spain.
3. The custody of a member of the United States personnel in Spain, who is legally
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subject to detention by the military authorities of the United States and over whom
Spanish jurisdiction is to be exercised, shall be the responsibility of the United States
military authorities, at their request, until the conclusion of all judicial proceedings
and, when appropriate, until his surrender is requested by the competent Spanish
authorities for execution of the sentence. During such period of custody by the United
States military authorities, those authorities, within the legal powers given them by
the military law of the United States, shall give full consideration to the decisions of
the competent Spanish authorities regarding conditions of custody. The United States
military authorities shall guarantee his immediate appearance before the competent
Spanish authorities in any proceedings that may require his presence and, in any case,
his appearance at the trial.
12. New Zealand SOFA, Memorandum of Understandings.
para. 4:
(b) For their part, the United States authorities will take measures to ensure respect for
the laws of New Zealand by United States personnel and will take whatever steps are
necessary to punish personnel who have committed acts which are offences against
those laws.
(c) United States personnel who have been arrested or apprehended, whether by the New
Zealand authorities or by the United States authorities, will be retained in custody by
the United States authorities, who shall produce the personnel concerned, upon request
by the New Zealand authorities, for investigation, identification or trial.
13. Dutch Supplementary Agreement, Annex:
3. The Netherlands authorities recognizing that it is the primary responsibility of the
United States authorities to maintain good order and discipline where persons subject
to United States military law are concerned will, upon the request of the United States
authorities, waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction under Article VII, except
where they determine that it is of particular importance that jurisdiction be exercised
by the Netherlands authorities. The United States assumes the responsibility for cus-
tody pending trial. The United States authorities will make these people immediately
available to Netherlands authorities upon their request for purposes of investigation
and trial and will give full attention to any other specific wishes of the appropriate
Netherlands authorities as to the way in which custody should be carried out.
14. Greek Supplementary Agreement, art. 3:
1. In any such cases where the Government of Greece may exercise criminal jurisdiction
as provided for in Article II above, the United States authorities shall take custody
of the accused pending completion of trial proceedings. Custody of the accused will
be maintained in Greece. During the trial and pretrial proceedings the accused shall
be entitled to have a representative of the United States Government present. The trial
shall be public unless otherwise agreed.
15. Provisions of German Supplementary Agreement:
Article 22:
1. (a) Where jurisdiction is exercised by the authorities of a sending State, custody of
members of the force, of the civilian component, or dependents shall rest with
the authorities of that State.
(b) Where jurisdiction is exercised by the German authorities, custody of members
of a force, of a civilian component, or dependents shall rest with the authorities
of the sending State in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article.
2. (a) Where the arrest has been made by the German authorities, the arrested person
shall be handed over to the authorities of the sending State concerned if such
authorities so request.
(b) Where the arrest has been made by the authorities of a sending State, or where
the arrested person has been handed over to them under sub-paragraph (a) of this
paragraph, they
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(i) may transfer custody to the German authorities at any time;
(ii) shall give sympathetic consideration to any request for the transfer of cus-
tody which may be made by the German authorities in specific cases.
(c) In respect of offences directed solely against the security of the Federal Republic,
custody shall rest with the German authorities in accordance with such arrange-
ments as may be made to that effect with the authorities of the sending State
concerned.
3. Where custody rests with the authorities of a sending State in accordance with para-
graph 2 of this Article it shall remain with these authorities until release or acquittal
by the German authorities or until commencement of the sentence. The authorities of
the sending State shall make the arrested person available to the German authorities
for investigation and criminal proceedings (Ermittlungs-'und Strafverfahren) and shall
take all appropriate measures to that end and to prevent any prejudice to the course
of justice (Verdunkelungsgefahr). They shall take full account of any special request
regarding custody made by the competent German authorities.
Article 23:
Where a person is arrested in any case referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the present
Agreement, a representative of the sending State concerned shall have access to that person.
Where a person arrested in any case referred to in paragraph 2 of that Article is held in
custody by the authorities of a force, a German representative shall have a corresponding right
to the extent to which the sending State avails itself of the right of access afforded by the
first sentence of this Article. The German authorities and the military authorities of the
sending State shall conclude such arrangements as may be required for the implementation
of this Article. A representative of the State which has custody may be present when the right
of access is exercised.
Article 26:
I. Where a member of a force or of a civilian component or a dependent is arraigned
before a court of a sending State for an offence committed in the Federal territory
against German interests, the trial shall be held in that territory
(a) except where the law of the sending State requires otherwise, or
(b) except where, in cases of military exigency or in the interests of justice, the
authorities of the sending State intend to hold the trial outside the Federal
territory. In this event they shall afford the German authorities timely opportun-
ity to comment on such intention and shall give due consideration to any com-
ments the latter may make.
2. Where the trial is held outside the Federal territory, the authorities of the sending State
shall inform the German authorities of the place and date of the trial. A German
representative shall be entitled to be present at the trial, except where his presence is
incompatible with the rules of the court of the sending State or with the security
requirements of that State, which are not at the same time security requirements of
the Federal Republic. The authorities of the sending State shall inform the German
authorities of the judgment and of the final outcome of the proceedings.
Protocol of Signature, Part II:
(1) Re Article 22:
The sending States shall retain the right to keep in custody the arrested person either in a
detention institution of their own or with their force. In order to ensure smooth implementa-
tion of the obligations imposed by the second sentence of paragraph 3 of Article 22, the
authorities of the sending State shall keep the arrested person, where possible in the vicinity
of the seat of the German authority dealing with the case; this, however, shall not constitute
an obligation on their part to keep the arrested person outside the area of the force.
(2) Re Article 26, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (6):
The term "military exigency" may also apply to cases in which the offence was committed
by a person temporarily present in the Federal territory for the purpose of training exercises
or manoeuvres.
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